1.
I am very grateful to Richard Swinburne for many helpful comments on a previous version of this paper
2.
Cf. A. Plantinga: The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon, 1974, ch. IX. pp. 164-93, and God, Freedom and Evil, New York, Harper & Row 1974, I, a.
3.
For the distinction between C-inductive and P-inductive arguments cf. his The Existence of God, Oxford, Clarendon, 1979, p. 7 ff.
4.
Swinburne's huge effort to show that were the theistic hypothesis true, we would find exactly -- or very approximately -- the evils we in fact find, that all evils are providential evils, seems to me unconvincing. Cf. op. cit. chp. 9-11.
5.
This is the view of Plantinga in God, Freedom and Evil, p. 34, and of Swinburne's «The Problem of Evil», in Brown (ed): Reason and Religion, Ithaca, Cornell U.P. 1977, p. 84, and I agree.
6.
This is R.M. Adams' position in his «Must God Create the Best?». Philosophical Review, 1982. I find it more difficult to accept Adams' arguments.
7.
A. Flew was quite aware of this theist move as a response to the atheists attack that would undermine the atheistic position. Cf. «Divine Omnipotence and Human freedom», in Flew & MacIntyre: New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London, SCM Press, 1955, p. 154.
8.
This example comes from William Rowe's «The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism». Now in Adams & Adams (eds): The Problem of Evil, Oxford U.P. 1990, p. 129-30.
9.
Of course, if it is unnoticeable by definition you could ask «what reason do we have to believe such cases really exist?» But this surely would be a tricky move. More decisive is the question whether there can be any fact ex hypothesi undiscoverable.
10.
Books that are very valuable, like John Hick's Evil and the God of Love, (London, Macmillan, 1966) or Richard Swinburne's The Existence of God, are rather disappointing when facing this topic, as Swinburne himself recognizes (p. 196 ff.). That this is the hardest problem has been emphasized by L. Kolakowsky in his On Religion (London, Fontana, 1982). Peter Geach's answer in Providence and Evil (Cambridge U.P. 1977), in terms of a God quite concernless of any kind of suffering, seems to me detestable. And C.S. Lewis solution in his The Problem of Pain (London, Geoffrey Bles, 1940), is highly speculative and leaves the problem unresolved for most animals in asserting than only well treated tame animals will be saved.
11.
R. Griffin has argued very well why soul-making theodicy can not account for animal suffering: i) if animal suffering may promote human virtues, what about animal suffering before the rise of man? And ii) if men should have been put within evolutionary process in order to keep epistemic distance, why had it to be so long a process with so much suffering? In S.T. Davis (ed): Encountering Evil. Live Options in Theodicy, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1981, p. 53. We could add iii) animals are supposed not to have a soul, at least not one capable of soul-making.
12.
Furthermore, the higher-good theodicy, probably the most suitable of all, has some difficulties of its own: Are the goods towards which evils are necessary means always so good at least as bad are the evils? Has anyone (even God) the right to cause evils to some in order to benefit others? What if lower evils bring about higher evils instead of higher goods? Cf. R. Swinburne: «Knowledge from Experience and the Problem of Evil», In Abraham & Holzer (eds): The Rationality of Religious Belief. Oxford, Clarendon, 1987. I can not pursue these issues here, but I'm afraid that this theodicy can not meet all these difficulties, mainly the first one (I owe points 1 and 2 to R. Swinburne).
13.
For Leibniz this is so eventually because he supposes that only one possible world can be actual, but this supposition, as I will try to show, is implausible. The Leibnizian remark that, in spite of all appearances, our world is the best possible one, appear scattered in many writings but, apart from his well known Essays of Theodicy and Discourse on Metaphysics, most emphatically in his opuscule On the radical origination of things (1697) where he brings together two inconsistent solutions: 1) that we must proceed entirely a priori in demonstrating that this world, as created by an omnipotent and morally perfect God, can not be but the best; but, 2) on the other hand, there also are a posteriori reasons of all kinds that show that all evils in the world play a (short o long term) beneficial role, and on that account even we can see that none of them are gratuitous! (Gerhard: Die philosophischen Schriften VII, p. 306-8).
14.
In several places. For instance in his Discourse on Metaphysics 8-9; and also in a Letter to Arnauld from 1686, where he says: «if, in the life of any person and even in the whole universe anything went differently from what it has, nothing could prevent us from saying that it was another person or another possible universe which God had chosen».
15.
Cf. D. Lewis: Counterfactuals, Oxford, Blackwell, 1973, p. 39 f. A. Plantinga: The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon, 1974, Ch. VI. G. Forbes: The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford, Clarendon, 1985, p. 57 f.; and Languages of Possibility, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, p. 72 f.
16.
In any case, should our theodicy admit realistic consequences about possible worlds, they would apply only to the worlds better than ours.
17.
Plantinga's argument against the possibility of more than one world being actual is that if W and W* are both actual and different, they must differ in at least one state of affairs S, such that W includes S and W* precludes S. «But then... S both obtains and does not obtain, and this... is repugnant to the intellect» (The Nature of Necessity, p. 45). But if more than one world is actual then truth (of propositions) and obtaining (of states of affairs) both become relative-to-worlds. And there is no problem in saying «S obtains in W and does not obtain in W*».
18.
This is the construction of possible worlds by Saul Kripke in «Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic», in L. Linsky (ed): Reference and Modality, Oxford U.P. 1971, p. 64. And in his Naming and Necessity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980. This seems also to be Stalnaker's position in his «Possible Worlds», Nous, 1976, p. 70.
19.
The Nature of Necessity, p. 131-163.
20.
The Existence of God, sp. ch. 3.
21.
I think that Swinburne grants some of this point when asserting that the prior probability of this world being created by God is not high, although he adds «Nor can I see that he [God] has overriding reason to make or not to make any alternative world» (The Existence of God, p. 130-1). The reasons offered by Robert Adams to show that God has no moral obligation to create worlds better than this one seem to me not to be compelling, for even if God has no duties to his (yet not existent) creatures, surely a being who acts only upon duties is far from being morally perfect and maximally holy. It is possible that God should also do his best as a supererogatory act, or may be God has a duty to himself to act at his best. Cf. R.M. Adams op. cit. So even if God has no obligation to create the best, a perfectly good God surely would do so.
22.
For instance, if you think that what forms the identity of a person is its haecceitas or thisness, then there could be infinitely many worlds qualitatively identical, that is made up of exactly the same properties predicated of qualitatively identical (but essentially different) individuals. I regard more plausible a qualitative conception of identity that would considerably reduce the number of worlds better than this. But anyway, there is no real need for any such reduction of worlds for God to create if He is truly infinite, eternal and omnipotent, and you dwell upon what these words mean.
23.
In the OT appear three kinds of creatures other than man: archangels (Dn. 8:16), seraphins (Is. 6:2), and cherubins (Ezequiel 1:5), and in other places. The NT enumerate seven kinds of beings: thrones, dominions, virtues, powers, principalities, archangels, and angels. Pseudo Dionysius Areopagiticus rearranged the nine kinds of being in three different hierarchies in his The Celestial Hierarchy. S. Jerome (De fide orthodoxa, II, 3) and S. Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. 38, In Theoph.) claimed that angels were begotten before creation of this physical world. But Aquinas opted for the other interpretation: «for the angels are part of the universe, in the sense that they do not constitute a universe on their own, but are combined with the physical creation to form one total world» (Suma Theol. I a. 61,3, Blackfriars ed. IX, p. 211). But adds «this, at any rate, seems a likely inference... However, the contrary view should not be called an error... Jerome is expressing the view of the Greek Fathers, all of whom held that the angels were created before the corporeal universe» (ibidem).
24.
That this is a fairly suitable world for humans to inhabit and develop themselves and their souls has been deeply and persuasively argued by John Hick in his Evil and the God of Love, sp. ch. 13-17.
25.
At the end of his An Interpretation of Religion (London, Macmillan, 1989), he acknowledges that we should suspend judgment concerning reincarnation, because the doctrine is coherent and has certain evidences in its support. And since it is incompatible with the teaching of christianity we can not reach a consensus on this point. Reincarnation is nonetheless fully compatible with soul-making theodicy. For the doctrine of Karma as an explanation of present world suffering see J. Bowker: Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World (Cambridge U.P. 1970). He asserts: «Karma is the exact working-out of cause and effect... particular instances of suffering are a direct consequence of a sufficient preceding cause», p. 248-9.
26.
Eternal punishment seems clearly incompatible with God's goodness, but the destruction of the damned which Swinburne proposes as an alternative («A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell», in Freddoso (ed): The Existence and Nature of God, Notre Dame U.P. 1983, p. 51) or their existing «for ever pursuing trivial pursuits» seems to me to entail a final failure in God's creation. If anyone would be damned or destroyed for ever, God's aims would have been thwarted. On the other hand, if one is free, one has the possibility of never becoming good, and God can not do that this one becomes good without compelling his will. So I would tentatively conclude that God should keep open the way of salvation for ever, but whether all will eventually decide to take this way we can not know in advance, because it is up to each of us, not up to God. I agree that God should not save anyone against his will.
27.
Descartes entertained animal mecanicism in many places, cf. N. Kemp Smith: New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes, London, Macmillan, 1953, p. 132 f. On the severe limitations that christian theodicies like the need of knowledge have when applied to animal suffering, cf. R. Swinburne: «Knowledge from Experience and the Problem of Evil», p. 165-67.
28.
Some two years ago in St Anthon's day Karol Woityla asserted we should treat animals well because «they also have a soul». And recall C.S. Lewis's case.
29.
This would spread Swinburne's account of divine omniscience, as voluntary restricted not to cover future free actions, to all future states of the world concerning its exact details. Cf. The Coherence of Theism, p. 172 ff.
30.
Cf. K. Popper & J. Eccles: The Self and its Brain, Berlin, Springer, 1977, sp Eccles's chapters.
31.
I am supposing that a world with humans must be governed by basic laws. If there were no basic laws at all, the world would be quite different, and it is very doubtful that we might describe `humans' as rational beings in it.
32.
I don't deny that in many cases suffering is good for other reasons: for bringing us closer to God, for making us repent, for endurance that strengthens character, for making us realize of our finitude, for providing opportunities to display higher virtues towards the sufferers, and so on. All of this is compatible with my account.
33.
Evil and the God of Love, p. 351. I am not saying that since God has reasons to put us in a religiously ambiguous world, the fact that the world is ambiguous in that there is no clear and distinctive trace of God, is itself evidence for God's existence. Only that it is not evidence against his existence.
34.
See also: [McCarthy, 1989], [Breuker, Valente, 1993], [Valente, Breuker, 1994].
35.
[Hofstadter, 1994], p. 14.
36.
which does not mean they are deductive!
37.
In simpler terms, the concept of logical validity (and of meaning as correspondence) is replaced by that of derivability: a proposition is valid if it is derived from the premises with the inference rules of the theory.
38.
See [Sartor, 1994], [Prakken, 1993], [Gordon, 1993], [Loui, 1993], [Hage, 1993], etc.; other recent proposals are in the Proceedings of the IV ICAIL, Boston, ACM, 1994.
39.
[Bongard, 1968].
40.
Cognitive science refers to this alternation to explain visual perception: the method has been translated into a series of programs and transferred to the sector of oral comprehension in order to reproduce the perception of spoken phrases. This has enabled the distinction of various levels of analysis, from phonemes, analyzed first as sound waves and then as phonetic hypotheses, to syllables, words, syntagms and finally phrases which are analyzed on the pragmatic level, placing them in possible contexts and then choosing the most plausible hypothesis of meaning.
41.
[Scank, 1986].
42.
[Hofstadter, 1994].
43.
The description of Brahman's schema is taken from [Guarino, 1993].
44.
ISA, «is a,» translates the relation of belonging of a subset to a set, while INST («instance of») translates the relation of belonging of an element to a set.
45.
[Cocchirella, 1991], p. 640.
46.
[Guarino, 1993].
47.
In [Gangemi, 1994], as the two other definitions which follow.
48.
[Guarino, 1993].
49.
In [Guarino, Carrara, Giaretta, 1994] it is specified how the language utilized for formalizing the ontological level is necessarily richer than the one utilized to represent the object knowledge, requiring the introduction of modal and temporal operators and of «mereological» relations.
50.
[Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyeca, 1958], [Toulmin, 1958], [Alexy, 1992].
51.
[Brewka, 1991], [Reiter, 1980].
52.
For a distinction between the types of analogy, see: [Tiscornia, 1994 a].
53.
[Loui, 1993], [Prakken, 1993], [Sartor, 1993], [Hage, 1993], [Gordon, 1993], [Yoshino, 1993]. In the argumentative models, the concept of logical consequence is substituted with that of defeasible consequence, which makes it possible to define further types of consequences (logical, plausible, defendable, etc.) provided that a counter-argument does not exist capable of invalidating the thesis sustained, and that this counter-argument exists and has a hierarchical level («force») equal or superior to the argument adopted. This brings with it a weakening of the nexus of causality between the antecedent of a norm (the facts of the case or their generalization in the normative case in point) and the legal consequence. As far as the nature of the interrelations between the conditions are concerned, these are necessary in the norms (and non-sufficient, if not in the non-monotonic sense), to establish the derivability of the consequent; in the precedents, the elements of the case are factors, each of itself relevant to the ends of the decision.
54.
[Tiscornia, 1993].
55.
In [Gordon, 1993], the predicate baking translates the relation between warrant and rule [Toulmin, 1958] which is to say, the logical/interpretative passage from the statement to the rule. In Sartor, the predicate applicable encompasses both the check of consistence and the correctness of interpretation.
56.
[Brachman, Fikes, Levesque, 1983].
57.
Both the large class of sortals and the non-sortals are in turn again included in the class of discriminating predicates, which is to say, such that of these it can be said for each individual that: it is P or it is not P.
58.
See [Brachman, Fikes, Levesque, 1983], [Guarino, 1994] and [Sowa, 1984].
59.
For the formal definition of these and other categories, see [Guarino, Carrara, Giaretta, 1994].
60.
See Guarino, 1994.
61.
See [Falzea, 1967, p. 942].
62.
The definition of the atomic components of the conceptual entity norm, which we examine here, represent a deeper structural analysis than the definition of the logical structure of the norm as rule, (point 5), generally viewed in the conditional form (if...case in point...then consequence); here, the bipartition of legal phenomena is translated into an identification of subjects and objects in logical subjects, while acts and facts are relations or properties which can be attributed to them and therefore predicates; the concept of individuals must always be intended as denoting classes of elements inside the logical universe taken into consideration: different hypotheses on the structure of the norm as collection of elements are in [Breuker, den Haan, 1991], and [van Kralingen, Schmidt, 1993].
63.
See [Schumann, 1001], p. 774.
64.
For a reformulation of the theory of linguistic acts from the viewpoint of law, see [Sartor, 1993b].
65.
firstly [Allen Saxon, 1986, 1991, 1993], then [Morris, McDermid, 1991], [Jones, Sergot, 1992].
66.
[Azzoni, 1994] reminds the distinction between deontic (the first four) and anankastic (the remaining).
67.
[Kanger, 1966].
68.
[Lindhal, 1977].
69.
Lindhal's theory of normative positions contains: the operators and syntax of propositional and predicative logic; the rules of deduction and the axioms belonging to it; plus the operators: Do (action); Shall (obligation); and the axioms and rules of inference belonging to them [Lindhal, 1977], p. 68.
70.
In 1986, J. Wroblewski, in the intent to define models of legal systems capable of being computerized, had proposed a definition of legal system (LS) composed of all of the legislative norms validly emanated (LSLE). The concept of validity was intended as «systemic» validity, which is to say: «A rule N is valid in LSLE if: (a) is a norm enacted in LS according to norms valid in LS, and is in force; (b) N is not derogated explicitly; (c) N is consistent with other norms valid in LS; (d) if it is inconsistent with at least one of the norms valid in LS, then either it does not lose its validity on the strength of the conflict of law rules, or is interpreted in a manner eliminating the inconsistency in question.» The model of normative system can be extended to include all of the norms inferable from LSLE (LSFC), adding a further criterion of validity: «(e) N is an acknowledged formal consequence of a norm valid in LSLE.» And further extended to include the interpretations of the norms valid in LSLE and in LSFC: «(h) or the rule is the result of an accepted interpretation of a rule valid in LSLE and/or LSFC.»
71.
In reality, a specific sector of legal informatics exists, legimatics, which produces systems that assist the automatic drafting of laws; for the present, however, the points of contact with the sector of artificial intelligence are few; future developments foresee the designing of systems for the automatic generation of legal texts which should utilize the same knowledge models described in this article. See (Tiscornia, 1994b).
72.
It is an accepted assumption in generative grammar that determiners constitute DP heads (see, for instance, Chomsky and Lasnik (1991)).
73.
We must be careful when using the word «presupposition». Nevertheless, we can state that, from Frege on, presuppositional effects have strongly influenced referential theories. Indeed, we will assume a close relation between presupposition and reference, but see Ariel(1990) for a criticism of such approaches.
74.
See Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976) for a procedural interpretation process.
75.
Ariel (1990) offers the following «geographic division of contexts»:
-- encyclopedic knowledge: stored in long-term memory, tend to be presupposed.
-- physical environment: stored in short-term memory, tend to be presupposed.
-- linguistic context: stored in short-term memory, plays an anaphoric role.
Even if natural languages code the «geographic source», what is important here is that, since we are able to speak about what we see (perceive), what we remember and what we linguistically decode, we must assume translations to common formats (see Jackendoff (1987) for attempts in this direction).
76.
Obviously, we will require a binding theory, a task beyond this paper.
77.
For the sake of simplicity, from now on we will be talking of «objects», when, strictly speaking, we should talk about objects, events or states.
78.
By saliency we mean that a mental representation is «activated» in a person's consciousness. Therefore, if a speaker owns an activated mental representation, that representation is familiar to him (be familiarity formal or epistemologically defined). Because of the existence of non activated mental representations, familiarity does not imply saliency. The crucial point here is that the speaker must calculate the addressee's consciousness activation state. Were such a calculation to be based on mutual knowledge, we should face the so-called «mutual knowledge paradox» (see Clark and Marshall (1981)). However, a complete revision of this question lies beyond this paper.
79.
Definite articles have descriptive content in some languages. So, Spanish and French, for instance, provide the object's gender indication. Latin, on the other hand, lacks these articles and, as a result, does not offer this type of guidelines for interpretation.
80.
Donnellan (1966) defined this dichotomy. Below, we offer an example adapted from Donnellan's -- nothing special goes in the adaptation.
81.
A puzzling question lies on whether «the object» referred to necessarily has to satisfy the «literal» description or whether a success in the referential act suffices. The discussion centers on truth-value assignment for propositions as:
(i) The man drinking a Martini is tall.
when that man is drinking water. For the time being, we skip these questions because we are primarily interested in cognitive significance of linguistic expressions.
82.
Karttunen (1974) noted that, provided with an ideally ordered discourse regarding shared information, speakers make «leaps and shortcuts». So, it is frequent to utter sentences such as (i) below instead of (ii) even though the existence of a Nicaraguan Prime Minister is not part of the current «conversational context»:
(i) The Prime Minister of Nicaragua is a woman.
(ii) There is a Prime Minister of Nicaragua and she is a woman.
All what is required to interpret (i) is to extend the context, to «accommodate» the missing information (Lewis (1979)). So, the speaker is allowed to act as if the shared information were wider than it actually is. Obviously, accommodation seems to be a too powerful mechanism.
83.
Of course, such a claim requires important moves in presuppositional theories (note that there is no semantic nor pragmatic oddity if Smith committed suicide). Indeed, as this paper advances we will progressively introduce hypotheses that alter presuppositional claims (see conclusions below).
84.
Weak understanding of an expression is the bare comprehension of its linguistic meaning, whereas strong understanding requires the contextual identification of the referred object. See Recanati (1993) and similar intuitions in Bar-Hillel (1954).
85.
In another sense, we can think of attributive readings as an accommodation process (see note 11). So, in our frame, we avoid the so-called «presupposition failure». Blatant presupposition failures, given the contemporary world, such as the following:
(i) The king of France is bald.
should be explained as contradictions between alleged presuppositions and encyclopedic knowledge.
86.
Strictly speaking, we should indistinctly talk about object-as-perceived, object-as-remembered and object-as-described, and so, about world-as-perceived, world-as-remembered and world-as-described.
87.
See Jackendoff (1983), (1987). Note, by the way, that if X were a representation of a «real» or «physical» object, provided the different sources of reference (see note 4) we could scarcely adopt a unified theory for definite descriptions.
88.
Note the approximate nature of this first characterization due to vagueness of high/low concepts.
89.
It is not easy to find encyclopedic antecedents for indexicals. Such an example could be:
(i) That wonderful time in London was extremely short.
To our mind, nothing special follows from possible asymmetry in antecedent's sources for indexicals and descriptions.
90.
Obvious exceptions are sentences as:
(i) This red car I bought last year runs well.
Note, by the way, that it is possible to use no term at all (Ariel (1988)):
(ii) Open with care.
91.
We can imagine a ghost uttering (7), or (7) being a sentence written on a piece of paper.
92.
The example appears in Nunberg (1993).
93.
By recognizing the simple fact that a linguistic utterance provides salience to an object and assuming the distinction in saliency we are drawing between indefinites and other referential expressions, we supply Heim's «novelty-familiarity condition» (Heim (1982)), that states that an indefinite NP cannot be an element of the «domain of files».
94.
Note that the addressee can succeed by finding a person who behaves as a person trying to seduce someone usually behaves -- and assuming that that person is a chess player.
95.
We have skipped the question of whether the reference assignment process is guided by psychological principles. For the time being, we leave this question open.
96.
Ambiguity theory followers adopt different «linguistic meanings» for each reading (it is not clear whether Donnellan himself adopted such a view). Neither implicature theory (where distinction lies on the pragmatic level of «what is communicated» -- Grice (1969)) nor contextual theory (where the difference comes from the contextual construction of a proposition expressed -- Recanati (1989)) are directly supported by our frame.
97.
The projection problem for presuppositions is concerned with explaining the presuppositions attached to complex sentences (see Soames (1982), Karttunen (1973), van der Sandt (1992), etc.).
98.
I am indebted to Victor Sanchez de Zavala, Jesus Maria Larrazabal and John Tynan for useful comments. Of course, I take full responsibility for mistakes. This work was supported by a Basque Country Government's scholarship-grant.
99.
Not everyone agrees. Some recent textual critics hold that texts are not the same. For example, Joseph Grigely argues that no text is iterable or repeatable, for each iteration or repetition is a new text owing to the new circumstances that surround the iteration. See «The Textual Event,» in Philip Cohen, ed., Devils and Angels: Textual Editing and Literary Theory (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1991), pp. 171-86. I do not intend to show that Grigely is wrong, but rather that there is a sense in which we can speak of texts as being the same and as being different.
100.
There are others as well, of course. For example, there is a view that considers authorial intention as determinant of textual identity, but this view presupposes the notion of an intended text which I reject in Chapter 3 of A Theory of Textuality (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995). The notion of an intended text is frequently used in the literature. See G. Thomas Tanselle, A Rationale of Textual Criticism (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp. 70 ff.
101.
This is one way to understand Jacques Derrida's view (for a second way, refer to the third view discussed below). The possibility of different and even contradictory meanings does not bother Derrida: la differance is for him of the essence of language. «Signature Event Context,» Glyph 1 (1977): 183-4 and 192-3. J. Meiland has also accused E.D. Hirsch, Jr., of holding this view. See «Interpretaton as Cognitive Discipline,» Philosophy and Literature 2 (1978): 32-3. Shillingsburg also appears to subscribe to a version of this view in Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age: Theory and Practice (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986), p. 49. See also Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 116 and 207.
102.
This position has been attributed to Hans-Georg Gadamer by Brice Wachterhauser in «Interpreting Texts: Objectivity or Participation?» Man and World 19 (1986): 442 and 453-5, where he criticizes it. It appears to be defended by Stanley Fish, in Is There a Text in This Class. The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. vii.
103.
This is a less radical version of the first view described above. It may also be a way of understanding Derrida's position. See the reference in n. 2, and Grigely, «The Textual Event,» p. 170.
104.
See, for example, Jerome J. McGann, The Textual Condition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 4.
105.
J.L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words, ed. J.O. Urmson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 98 ff.
106.
James McLaverty has defended the view of a text as an utterance, but he understand an utterance as the product of certain acts such as putting forth, issuing, expressing, publishing, etc. And he also brings in authorial intention, but not intention of meaning (as do Hirsch and others), but of utterance. A text is the intended product of a vcertain authorial acts such as publishing. See «Issues of Idetity and Utterance: An Intentionalist Response to `Textual Instability,»' in Cohen, ed., Devils and Angels, particularly pp. 140 and 144. Mikhail M. Bakhtin also describes a text as an utterance in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), p. 105.
107.
For an exception, see Gregory Currie, «Work and Text,» Mind 100 (1991)): 325-39.
108.
Several of the articles in Cohen's Devils and Angels take up this issue. Particularly relevant is McLaverty's «Issues of Identity and Utterance.»
109.
Cf. Roderick M. Chisholm, «Identity through Time,» in On Metaphysics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 25 ff.
110.
It is not necessary for us to dwell on the nature of texts in order to discuss the issue of their achronic sameness. Nor is it significant at this point to distinguish between relatively simple and more compleř texts. For our purposes it will suffice to give some examples of simple texts. For a more in depth discussion of the nature of texts, see my Theory of Textuality, Ch. 4.
111.
W.V.O. Quine's view that no two sentences from two different languages can have the same meaning does not undermine the view that a necessary condition of textual identity is meaning identity, although it does preclude the possibility that two sentences from two different languages could be textually the same. «Indeterminacy of Translation Again,» Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 9-10.
112.
The notion of author has become the subject of considerable discussion in the recent literature. For present purposes, however, I am adopting the conception of an author as the producer of a text on pragmatic grounds, for the sake of simplicity and brevity, since my argument is not affected by the issues that have become controversial. For the pertinent literature on this subject, see: Michel Foucault, «What Is an Author?,» in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Donald F. Bouchard, ed., Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, trans. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 113-38; Robert Barthes, «The Death of an Author,» in Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), pp. 142-8; William E. Cain, «Authors and Authority in Interpretation,» Georgia Review 34 (1980), 617-34; Alexander Nehamas, «Writer, Text, Work, Author,» in Anthony J. Cascardi, ed., Literature and the Question of Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1987), pp. 265-91; Michael L. Morgan, «Authorship and the History of Philosophy,» Review of Metaphysics 42(1988), 327-55; and my own «Texts and Their Interpretation,» Review of Metaphysics 43(1990), 520-27; «Can There Be Texts Without Historical Authors?» American Philosophical Quarterly 31, 3 (1994): 245-53; and «Author and Repression,» Contemporary Philosophy 16, 4 (1995): 23-9.
113.
For example, St. John of the Cross' poem Spiritual Canticle and the essay with the same title that is supposed to explain the poem presumably have the same meaning even though one is short and poetic in form and the other is long and prosaic.
114.
Jorge Luis Borges, «Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,» in Labyrinths, trans. and ed., Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby (New York: New York Directions, 1962), pp. 36-44.
115.
For an analysis of the various types of audiences of a text, see my «Texts and Their Interpretation,» pp. 527-33, and «Can There Be Texts Without Audiences. The Identity and Function of Audiences,» Review of Metaphysics 47 (1994): 711-34.
116.
I do not mean to say by this as E. D. Hirsch seems to do, that the meaning of a text is to be identified with the author's intention. The author of a text can be responsible for its meaning without having to have an intentional meaning in mind which precedes the production of a text. For Hirsch's view see, for example, The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 8, and Validity and Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 26, 31, 48-9, and passim. For a discussion of Hirsch's views, see Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 43-8.
117.
Most of the objections would be based on the fact that `Thomas Aquinas' is a proper name, while `the Angelic Doctor' could be construed as a definite description. But then it is questionable whether `the Angelic Doctor' is really a definite description. See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 26; also John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 173; and my Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 227-29.
118.
See «Texts and Their Interpretation,» Review of Metaphysics 43 (1990): 496-500.
119.
Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1989, 323 pp.
120.
I am very thankful to Raul Orayen for his comments on a previous version of this paper and to J.J.C. Smart for his kind help in making its style less unEnglish.
121.
Unfortunately we cannot yet handle TeX or LaTeX files. The convertors we've tried have proved useless.
122.
The following information is mainly due to Ian Graham. We have abridged some relevant parts of his document and added the item concerning LaTeX.
HTML Writer HTML Writer is a Windows-based HTML editor. Additional information can be found at: http://www.et.byu.edu/~nosackk/html-writer/index.html.
HoTMetaL for Windows is a commercial HTML editor, but afree implementation is available via anonymous FTP. There may also be Mac (and other) versions. SoftQuad (who makes HoTMetaL) has their own Web server with up-to-date information. There are several anonymous ftp sources of the HoTMetaL executable. One is in gatekeeper.dec.com, while another is the NCSA ftp archive.
PC-Write-HTML-Editing-Macros, a package for editing HTML docs with the PC-Write editor, is available at: ftp://www.ucc.ie/pub/pcw4.zip.
HTML Assistant is an MS Windows text editor with extensions to assist in the creation of HTML hypertext docs to be viewed by World Wide Web browsers like Cello and Mosaic. FTP-available from ftp.cs.dal.ca/htmlasst/.
HyperEdit is a facility designed for MS-Windows users to aid in the creation of HTML docs. Version v0.2a is largely based on «A Beginners Guide to HTML» produced by NCSA. Author: Steve Hancock, s.hancock@info.curtin.edu.au.
CU_HTML.DOT CU_HTML.DOT is a Microsoft Word for Windows 2.0 doc template that allows users to create HTML docs inside Word in a WYSIWYG manner and generate a corresponding HTML file. The ZIP file is at ftp.cuhk.hk/ /pub/www/windows/util/CU_HTML.ZIP.
HTML for Word 2.0 by NICE technologies, France, creates a structured doc environment for Word 2.0. It creates doc instances that conform to ISO 8879 (SGML), and is available from the ftp.cica.indiana.edu FTP site or from its mirrors. Additional information: Eric van Herwijnen, NICE technologies, chemin des Hutins, Veraz, 01170 Gex, France. Tel (33)-50424940.
HTMLed, a customizable HTML editor with toolbars, can be obtained via anonymous ftp at pringle.mta.ca/pub/HTMLed. The file is htmed12.zip.
Rtftohtml, which converts Microsoft RichText Format to HTML, supports WORD 6.0 RTF files. This program is useful for MS-Word docs, as these use RTF format as the doc code. This code can be used on Macintoshes, PC's or on Unix boxes. RTFTOHTM-Tools is a distribution containing a conversion DLL and a doc template for WinWord 2.0. This sotware (rtftohtm.dll and html.dot) when used together, allow transparent conversion from WinWord to HTML, not only from RTF to HTML.
PSTOHTML (PostScript-to-HTML Converter)is a Perl-script package for converting postscript-to-html, and also for converting PostScript to plain text. If you have perl on you PC, then you can run this. Users of this code need a postscript interpreter, e.g.
LaTeX2HTML is a Perl program that converts documents written in LaTeX into the HTML format. It handles equations, tables, figures, footnotes, lists and bibliographies. It translates accented and special characters to the equivalent ISO-LATIN-1 character set whenever possible. The actual code is located at http://cbl.leeds.ac.uk/nikos/tex2html/latex2html.tar or http://cbl.leeds.ac.uk/nikos/tex2html/latex2html.tar-gz. The author is Nikos Drakos, <nikos@cbl.leeds.ac.uk>, http://cbl.leeds.ac.uk/nikos/personal.html.
123.
Mike Albert's address is P. O. Box 535, Bedford, MA 01730, USA.
124.
For the time being, and as a service to our readers and contributors, we have a directory called `soft' hanging from our directory sorites at the node ftp.csic.es. The directory contains some of the non-commercial software we are referring to, such as archivers or 8-to-7 encoders (or 7-to-8 decoders).
125.
In the case of WordPerfect 5.1, the procedure is as follows. Suppose you have a file called `dilemmas.wp5' in your directory c:\articles, and you want to submit it to SORITES. At your DOS prompt you change to your directory c:\articles. We assume your WordPerfect files are in directory c:\WP51. At the DOS prompt you give the command `\wp51\convert'; when prompted you reply `dilemmas.wp5' as your input file whatever you want as the output file -- suppose your answer is `dilemmas.ker'; when prompted for a kind of conversion you choose 1, then 6. Then you launch you communications program, log into your local host, upload your file c:\articles\dilemmas.ker using any available transmission protocol (such as Kermit, e.g.). And, last, you enter your e_mail service, start an e_mail to to sorites@ifs.csic.es and include your just uploaded dilemmas.ker file into the body of the message. (What command serves to that effect depends on the e_mail software available; consult your local host administrators.)
With WordPerfect 6 the conversion to kermit format is simple and straightforward: you only have to save your paper as a `kermit (7 bits transfer)' file.
126.
Those devices are temporary only. Later on we'll strongly advise and encourage those of our contributors who can use neither WordPerfect format nor one of the other word-processor formats our convertors can handle automatically to resort to HTML, with certain conventions in order to represent Greek characters as well as logical and set-theoretic symbols.
127. The reader may find an excellent discussion of copyright-related issues in a FAQ paper (available for anonymous FTP from rtfm.mit.edu [18.70.0.209] /pub/usenet/news.answers/law/Copyright-FAQ). The paper is entitled «Frequently Asked Questions about Copyright (V. 1.1.3)», 1994, by Terry Carroll. We have borrowed a number of considerations from that helpful document.