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SORITES ISSN 1135-1349
Issue #03. November 1995. Pp. 4-6
Abstracts of the Papers
Copyright © by SORITES and the authors
Abstracts of the Papers
Reasoning with Imperatives Using Classical Logic
Joseph S. Fulda
Traditionally, imperatives have been handled with deontic logics, not the
logic of propositions which bear truth values. Yet, an imperative is issued by
the speaker to cause (stay) actions which change the state of affairs, which
is, in turn, described by propositions that bear truth values. Thus,
ultimately, imperatives affect truth values. In this paper, we put forward an
idea that allows us to reason with imperatives using classical logic by
constructing a one-to-one correspondence between imperatives and a particular
class of declaratives.
A Naive Variety of Logical Consequence
Enrique Alonso
The semantic analysis of logical consequence must obey a set of requisites
which nowadays have acquired a dogmatic status. This situation prevents the
development of other varieties of this fundamental relation. In this issue we
try to define what we call a naive variety of logical consequence. The main
feature of this relation is the way it depends on formulas in premises and
conclusion: every sentence must contribute to the acceptability of an argument
in a significative way. This circumstance can be of some interest
for research programs demanding a logical apparatus sensitive to application
context. We think of the logic LP developed by G. Priest -- Priest [1979] --
in relation to Gödel incompleteness theorems as a test for our points of
view.
Humor and Harm
Laurence Goldstein
For familiar reasons, stereotyping is believed to be irresponsible and
offensive. Yet the use of stereotypes in humor is widespread. Particularly
offensive are thought to be sexual and racial stereotypes, yet it is just these
that figure particularly prominently in jokes. In certain circumstances it is
unquestionably wrong to make jokes that employ such stereotypes. Some writers
have made the much stronger claim that in all circumstances it is wrong to find
such jokes funny; in other words that people who laugh at such jokes betray
sexist/racist attitudes. This conclusion seems false. There is, as I shall
argue, a thin dividing line between being properly sensitive to the rights and
feelings of women and of racial groups different from our own, and being
excessively sensitive to oversensitivity. Oversensitivity is, in this context,
a kind of intolerance, and there is no reason why we should pander to that. One
can be opposed to the unchecked dissemination of certain kinds of racist or
sexist humor without oneself being a racist or sexist for finding such humor
funny. The use of various stereotypes in humor serves the linguistic purpose
of facilitating brevity and punch, the cultural purpose of preserving, in a
sanitized form traditional rivalries and antipathies, and the psychological
purpose of discharging fears. Blanket moral condemnation is inappropriate,
though there will, of course, be circumstances under which the promulgation of
certain types of humor, or even its enjoyment, ought to be condemned.
What is Semantics? A Brief Note on a Huge Question
Newton C. A. da Costa, Otávio Bueno & Jean-Yves
Béziau
After mentioning the cogent connection between pure semantics and the
particular set theoretical framework in which it is formulated, some issues
regarding the conceptual status of semantics itself, as well as its
relationship to logic, are concisely raised.
A Note on Truth, Deflationism and Irrealism
Pierluigi Miraglia
The paper deals with a problem about irrealist doctrines of content, according
to which there are no real properties answering to content-attributing
expressions. The central claim of the paper is that the distinction between
factual and non-factual discourse (key to irrealism) is independent from
particular conceptions of truth, and is thus compatible with a deflationary
conception. This claim is sustained by an examination of what I take to be
significant aspects of the deflationary conception. I argue therefore directly
against Paul Boghossian's paper «The Status of Content», which attempted to
show that irrealism about content is inconsistent.