This opinion was further confirmed by consulting Professor C.J.F. Williams.
2. 1_2.
(1990) Jerry A. Fodor, Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, MIT Press), p.190.
3. 1_3.
Ibid.
4. 1_4.
Ibid., p.167.
5. 1_5.
Ibid., p.189.
6. 1_6.
Ibid., p.176.
7. 1_7.
(1968) Leslie A. White,»Culturology» in the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, p. 547.
8. 1_8.
See his reply in Perspectives on Quine, p. 292: «I was on the Kantian course».
9. 1_9.
Replies in Perspectives on Quine, p. 291.
10. 1_10.
Special thanks to Anthony Rudd, University of Bristol, who, discussing with me in detail two final drafts, challenged me to clarify the argument; to Adriano P. Palma who commented on the opaqueness of an earlier version; it was circulated under a different title and was also sent to the 1995 Third Analysis Essay Competition.
11. 2_1.
H. Putnam, Representation and Reality, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988.
12. 2_2.
See R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1942, pp. 11 f. and 155, and R. Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications, New York, Dover, 1958, pp. 79 f.
Tarski used the term «descriptive semantics» in the same sense as Carnap; see A. Tarski, «The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics» (in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1944), pp. 341-375), p. 365. In this paper Tarski employs the expression «theoretical semantics» to refer to the kind of semantics he develops (see pp. 345, 348, 362 and 365). Theoretical semantics in the sense of Tarski is the semantics of formalized languages, hence it corresponds to pure semantics in the sense of Carnap.
13. 2_3.
Putnam, op. cit., p. 62.
14. 2_4.
Putnam, op. cit., pp. 62 and 66.
15. 2_5.
Putnam, op. cit., p. 62.
16. 2_6.
Putnam considers it an unacceptable consequence of the semantical conception of truth not only that according to this truth conception the T-equivalences are logically necessary, but also that according to it these equivalences are logically true. However, from the context of his argumentation (see Putnam, op. cit., pp. 62 f.) it seems clear that Putnam regards both objections as equivalent. For this reason I shall take into account only the first of them.
17. 2_7.
Putnam, op.cit., p. 63.
18. 2_8.
Putnam, op. cit., p. 65. Putnam raises this objection to the definition of a language in Carnap's semantics not only on the basis of the truth rules, but also of the designation (or reference) rules which belong to this definition. I do not present these designation rules, because they are not necessary for an understanding of Putnam's objection.
19. 2_9.
See note 5.
20. 2_10.
On the other hand, it is obvious that the T-equivalences are logically necessary if one regards them (and more generally the truth definition) as part of the definition of the language, as Carnap does -- see text from note 7 in which Putnam describes Carnap's reply to him.
Here we find a noteworthy difference between Tarski's and Carnap's semantics. In Carnap's semantics the definition of truth for a language belongs to the description of the language; in Tarski's semantics this is not the case. Tarski pointed out this difference: «[...] if we took a different point of view, represented, e.g., in Carnap [Introduction to Semantics]; i.e., if we regarded the specification of conditions under which sentences of a language are true as an essential part of the description of this language [...]» (A. Tarski, op. cit., p. 373, n. 24).
21. 2_11.
Putnam, op. cit., p. 66.
22. 2_12.
Ibid.
23. 3_1.
Reference is made here, in particular, to J. Habermas' following works: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Ffm 1981 (from here on referred to as TkH); «Entgegnung», in A. Honneth u. H. Joas (eds.), Kommunikatives Handeln, Ff, 1986; Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des komm. Handelns, Ffm 1984; Nachmetaphysisches Denken, Ffm 1989; typescript of the Vorlesung held at the university of Frankfurt a.M., Winter Semester 1994.
24. 3_2.
J. Habermas (1994), Vorlesung, Ms., p. 28.
25. 3_3.
Ibid.
26. 3_4.
Ibid., p. 27.
27. 3_5.
Esp.: C. Lafont, La razón como lenguaje, Madrid 1993; id, Sprache und Welterschließung, Ffm 1994, esp. pp. 262-326.
28. 3_6.
This argument applies to a general philosophical-linguistic domain Gadamer's re-elaboration of Hegel's critic against Kant in the domain of ethics. According to this view, and in opposition to e.g. Prof. Apel's semiotics based on Peirce, reflexion can never transcend contextual dependency.
29. 3_7.
It should be made clear here that, although both proposals, a theory of direct reference and internal realism are referred back to Putnam, they represent two different moments in Putnam's philosophical developments. From the first one, as exposed in his works «Meaning and reference» (The Journal of Philosophy 70/19 (1973), pp. 699-711) and «The meaning of `meaning'» (in Mind, Language and Reality (Philosophical Papers 2), Cambridge, Mass. 1975, pp. 215-271), Putnam took a critical distance because of what he considered to be Kripke's «magical» (metaphysical) theory of reference. His second stance, internal realism, is to be found e.g. in his works Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, mass., 1981; cf. pp. 46-48 for the criticism stated above) and Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass. 1988). The epistemic conception of truth here defended -- as justified acceptability under ideal conditions -- is abandoned later and critically qualified as a form of «moderate verificacionism» related to a kind of scientific realism. Since then Putnam has modified his position, first emphasizing the pragmatical component of what he went on calling internal realism, and most recently by approaching naturalism (cf. Putnam (1994): «The Dewey Lectures», in The Journal of Philosophy 91/9 (1994)). In the present discussion a somewhat «unorthodox» reading of Putnam's thinking has been accomplished, as later again adverted, to the extend that Putnam's first theory of direct reference (Putnam (1973), (1975)) is integrated within his posterior pragmatical realism (Putnam (1981), (1988)). -- I am grateful to Manuel Liz for some remarks concerning this point
30. 3_8.
Cf., e.g., TkH, ibid., vol. 2, pp. 583-593.
31. 3_9.
These theories do not constrain themselves to classical or a particular logic, nor are they committed to assign psychological (or any other kind of) reality to the assumed underlying logic. Linguistic theories such as Generative Grammar or Categorial Grammar make use of an (extended) intensional logic, yet explicitly refusing to see this semantical model as different from just a descriptive account.
32. 3_10.
Cf. e.g. Ch. Thiel's interpretation on Frege. Although Thiel is a member of the Erlangen Schule and thus subscribes a constructivist view, his account on Frege's philosophy of language seems to me accurate and valid. This very problem underlies also Quines's proposal, according to which semantical models should be defined without introducting constant terms standing for proper names of individuals; instead, any referring expression should be accounted for in terms of quantified variables, these latter playing the role of «provisory» names for insufficiently-known entities -- which could turn out to possess other properties or just not to «exist». It is evident that Quine has submitted to other epistemological and theoretical commitments; but this belongs again to the domain of theory of science (or ontology) and not necessarily to that of formal semantics, that is to say, to the development of formal languages to be applied as instrumental devices in order to a posteriori explicit the minimal or essential categories a theory does convey.
33. 3_11.
TkH, vol 2, pp. 30-31.
34. 3_12.
Ibid., p. 29.
35. 3_13.
J. Habermas, «Erläuterungen zum Begriff des komm. Handelns», in Vorstudien ..., ibid., p. 600.
36. 3_14.
Ibid.
37. 3_15.
To a certain extent, the TkH seems to have faced mentalist or intentionalist theories under the assumption that relativism would arise from the realm of subjectivity. At the same time, in an effort to preserve a critical perspective on society, the theory concentrated on the analysis of an archetipical society and lifeworld. This fact could have concealed the risk of meaning holism.
38. 3_16.
Ibid. [my emphasis, C.C.]
39. 3_17.
Therefore the question «How do we come to uderstand a new word?» was to be answered by giving the «core facts» that show the function fulfilled by the use of a word -- those core facts conforming its associated stereotype: «To sum this up: there are a few facts about `lemon' or `tiger' (I shall refer to hem as core facts) such that one can convey the use of `lemon' or `tiger' by simply conveying such facts (...) given the function of a kind of word, it is not difficult to explain why certain facts function as core facts for conveying the use of words of that kind.»
H. Putnam, «Is semantics possible?», in S.P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, Ithaca, London, 1977, pp. 102-107, here 114, 118 [my emphasis, C.C.]
40. 3_18.
J. Elster, Explaining technical change, Cambridge 1983, p. 57; quoted in J. Bohman, «The completeness of macro-sociological explanations», Protosoziologie 5 (1992), p. 106 [my emphasis, C.C.]
41. 3_19.
A. Müller, «Referenz und Projizierbarkeit», Ms., Ffm 1994 (reprinted in the first number of Sorites).
42. 3_20.
Ibid., pp. 16, 18, 21.
43. 3_21.
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
44. 3_22.
Ibid., p. 21.
45. 3_23.
Quoted in ibid., p. 18 [the original italics are not respected, C.C.]
46. 3_24.
Similarly, to talk of «synthetic a priori» terms seems paradoxical, given the fact that (after the de-transcendentalization in philosophy related to the linguistic turn) language counts as the only aprioric instance in our experience and, henceforth, the pre-existing meanings become constitutive for the Weltanschauung. To this extent, talking of «a priori» terms seems to recover an a priori in our knowledge with respect to linguistic experience. But the inevitable «substantivation» carried out by this move questions the claimed universalism in the discussed proposal.
47. 3_25.
«... die durch keine Gesamtheit an Wissen definitiv überbrückt werden kann.» Ibid., p. 18.
48. 3_26.
Quine's remark that we introduce a «new» entity whenever we are unable to «descompose» it in pre-established relations among other, simpler ones, seems to have a point here. But he interprets it as an argument in favor of meaning holism.
49. 3_27.
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
50. 3_28.
Ibid., p. 18. [italics under reflexiv are mine, C.C.] Although this passage interprets what has been accomplished by Goodman and Wittgenstein, I think it states also what could be seen as the core idea in A. Müller's critical analysis and what I have in my turn tried to reconstruct following him.
51. 3_29.
J. Habermas, TkH, vol. 2, p. 588. Although the discussion here is concerned with the confrontation among different Weltanschauungen, the same expression reappears in Vorstudien.... (ibid.), in the answer to M. Hesse's objections, and in other places as well, where the discussion is unambiguously epistemological. And the same idea is anticipated as well in the apparent paradoxe pointed at by A. Müller: «Es fragt sich also, was die in einer solchen Reflexion (...) zutage tretenden normativen Voraussetzungen der Verwendungs-weise von Prädikaten im allgemeinen sind, die ein Lernen aus Erfahrungen nicht verhindern.» (ibid., p.14 [last italics mine, C.C.])
52. 3_30.
Here I closely follow A. Müller, ibid. pp. 14, 21, 16. The difference between the sign and that designed by it can also be seen as arising from the background of aproblematic presuppositions.
53. 3_31.
C. Lafont, «Dilemas en torno a la verdad» and «Verdad, saber y realidad», Ms, Ffm 1994 (henceforth referred to as DV and VSR resp.; the second is reprinted in the first number of Sorites.)
54. 3_32.
Cf. VSR, p. 14.
55. 3_33.
Cf. ibid., pp. 12, 13.
56. 3_34.
Cf. ibid., p. 10.
57. 3_35.
A. Wellmer, quoted in J. Habermas, «Entgegnung», ibid. p. 352; ref. to in VSR, p. 10.
58. 3_36.
Cf. VSR, p. 11. Nevertheless, Prof. Wellmer's argument does not seem to be concerned mainly with a strictly epistemic notion of truth -- as it becomes manifest in his consideration of the problem «in welchem Sinne ein infiniter begründeter Konsens nicht auch wahr gennant werden sollte» (A. Wellmer, Ethik und Dialog, Ffm 1986, p. 81.). Here true seems to mean valid in a wider sense. Prof. Wellmer's discussion is concerned with the Letztbegrüngsproblem of the Diskursethik, namely the extent to which a Konsenstheorie (of truth, or validity in general), «die sich, wie gesagt, nicht mehr criterial verstehen läßt», makes possible «die starken Hintergrundannahmen rechtfertigen (...), die der diskursethischen Reformulierung des Universalisierungsgrundsatzes zugrunde liegen» (ibid.) In fact, in the course of the present argumentation these strong background presuppositions should be seen as playing an essential role.
59. 3_37.
Cf. DV, p. 14.
60. 3_38.
Cf. VSR, p. 13.
61. 3_39.
Cf. DV, p. 15.
62. 3_40.
Cf. VSR, p. 9.
63. 3_41.
Cf. J. Habermas' typescript of the Volesung held in Ffm, WS 1994.
64. 3_42.
The need to distinguish between the idealizations that a criterial notion of rationality does embody, and those concerned with the formal conditions in which the discussion is to take place and with the competence that allows us to participate in it, is taken into consideration in A. Wellmer's critical conclusion, when he wrotes: «Die Idealisierung erläutet hier in der Tat eine Sinnbedingung dessen, was wir `rationales Argumentieren' oder auch `rationales Überlegen' nennen (...) wir [würden] uns über den Sinn der notwendigen Unterstellung intersubjektiv geteilter Bedeutungen täuschen, wenn wir sie als Antizipation einer letzten, einer idealen Sprache verstehen.» (Ethik und Dialog, ibid., p. 112) The same applies, in my opinion, to a non-fallible knowledge or a «last great theory».
65. 3_43.
J. Habermas, Vorstudien..., ibid., p. 554.
66. 3_44.
Ibid., p. 561.
67. 3_45.
J. Habermas, Vorstudien..., ibid., p. 555.
68. 3_46.
In this sense do I interpret the claim: «Ich verstehe die Diskurstheorie der Wahrheit so, dass sie den diskursiv erzielten Konsens nicht (...) als Wahrheitskriterium auszeichnen soll.» (J. Habermas, «Entgegnung», ibid., p. 352. Inconditionality and fallibilist reservation do not take place simultaneously.
69. 3_47.
J. Habermas, TkH, ibid., vol. 2, p. 335.
70. 3_48.
This imputation of «absolutization» could be applied not only to the realist assumption of an objective world, but to the non-epistemic concept of truth as well, if -- on the basis of the above presupposition -- this notion is identified with logical bivalence. For, as Quine has shown, a formal bivalence is always «translatable», although this possibility of translation does not warrant that the intuitive pre-understanding of the bivalent function and the intuitive pre-understanding of the notion of truth in correspondence with it are the same (from a pragmatical perspective) for the speakers of both natural languages, the tranlated and the translating one. This turns the possible universalism of this formal-semantical trait into almost impossible to falsify, but it is impossible as well to confirm its pragmatical universality -- in the desired sense.
71. 3_49.
A new difficulty arises here which should be dealt with, given the fact that the more recent scientific developments do not consider the «laws» of nature to be causal laws and even reject this very notion.
72. 4_1.
Unfortunately we cannot yet handle TeX or LaTeX files. The convertors we've tried have proved useless.
73. 4_2.
At our home site, ftp.csic.es, there is -- hanging from our main directory /pub/sorites -- a subdirectory, WWW, which, among other files, contains one called `HTML.howto', wherein the interested reader can find some useful information on HTML editors and convertors.
74. 4_3.
For the time being, and as a service to our readers and contributors, we have a directory called `soft' hanging from our home directory /pub/sorites at the node ftp.csic.es. The directory contains some of the non-commercial software we are referring to, such as archivers or 8-to-7 encoders (or 7-to-8 decoders).
75. 4_4.
In the case of WordPerfect 5.1, the procedure is as follows. Suppose you have a file called `dilemmas.wp5' in your directory c:\articles, and you want to submit it to SORITES. At your DOS prompt you change to your directory c:\articles. We assume your WordPerfect files are in directory c:\WP51. At the DOS prompt you give the command `\wp51\convert'; when prompted you reply `dilemmas.wp5' as your input file whatever you want as the output file -- suppose your answer is `dilemmas.ker'; when prompted for a kind of conversion you choose 1, then 6. Then you launch you communications program, log into your local host, upload your file c:\articles\dilemmas.ker using any available transmission protocol (such as Kermit, e.g.). And, last, you enter your e_mail service, start an e_mail to <sorites@ifs.csic.es> and include your just uploaded dilemmas.ker file into the body of the message. (What command serves to that effect depends on the e_mail software available; consult your local host administrators.)
With WordPerfect 6 the conversion to kermit format is simple and straightforward: you only have to save your paper as a `kermit (7 bits transfer)' file.
76. 5_1.
The reader may find an excellent discussion of copyright-related issues in a FAQ paper (available for anonymous FTP from rtfm.mit.edu [18.70.0.209] /pub/usenet/news.answers/law/Copyright-FAQ). The paper is entitled «Frequently Asked Questions about Copyright (V. 1.1.3)», 1994, by Terry Carroll. We have borrowed a number of considerations from that helpful document.