[Foot Note 1_1]
Work supported by a grant of the Swiss National Science Foundation
[Foot Note 2_1]
With thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell, Mark Colyvan and Dominic Hyde for helpful discussion of these issues.
[Foot Note 3_1]
Henceforth I use «object» to refer to any non-basic particular that is composed of particulars arranged in some manner. Moreover, I do not use «object»as a term of art to refer to some sub-set of the composite things that exist. I do not use object, for instance, to refer just to those composite things that are recognised by our conceptual apparatus, or which have some sort of natural border. Rather, all composite things that exist are objects.
[Foot Note 3_2]
Henceforth I use «particulars» to refer to the most basic things that exist, whatever these things are.
[Foot Note 3_3]
Proponents of this view include Van Inwagen (1987) and Wiggins(1980).
[Foot Note 3_4]
Defenders of restricted composition include Van Inwagen (1990) and Wiggins (1980).
[Foot Note 3_5]
Defenders of unrestricted mereological composition include Lewis (1991) and Heller (1990).
[Foot Note 3_6]
Perdurantism is to be distinguished from other versions of four dimensionalism such as Ted Sider's stage view according to which our everyday linguistic terms do not refer to the mereological fusion of temporal parts, but rather to temporal stages. Claims about the past and future of these persisting objects are then made true by the existence of the relevant temporal counterparts. While the stage view is not technically a perdurantist view, it will be open to the same sorts of criticisms that I level against a sparsist version of perdurantism.
For a defence of the stage view see Sider (2001).
[Foot Note 3_7]
See for example Lewis (1991); Heller (1990).
[Foot Note 3_8]
Cf. van Inwagen (1987); Heller (1990); Lewis (1986). pp. 212-213; Wiggins (1980); Markosian (1998).
[Foot Note 3_9]
Wiggins (1980). pp. 57-70
[Foot Note 3_10]
Van Inwagen (1990). chapter 10 pg. 98
[Foot Note 3_11]
Where to say that an object has some border is not to say that it has some determinate border, only that the border, if it is vague, is discernible.
[Foot Note 3_12]
Cf. Van Inwagen (2000).
[Foot Note 3_13]
Sider (2001) pg. 60; Zimmerman (1996); Markosian (1994).
[Foot Note 3_14]
Sider (2001) pg. 60.
[Foot Note 3_15]
van Inwagen (1981). pg. 203.
[Foot Note 3_16]
Of course, someone might resist the idea that we have perdurance all the way down, on the grounds that there are smallest units of spacetime such as the Planck length and Planck time. In that case DITP should be altered to be the doctrine of the shortest temporal parts (DSTP). While it is true that these shortest temporal parts would not perdure (just as instantaneous temporal parts do not perdure), and this technically an adoption of DSTP might be seen as a hybrid view, the general point remains the same: it cannot be that the onlytemporal parts that exist are extended temporal parts with natural borders.
[Foot Note 3_17]
McCall (1994). pp. 211-214
[Foot Note 3_18]
McCall attempts to solve this problem by arguing that three and four dimensionalism are equivalent theories. I am sympathetic to this view, but I do not see how it helps in this matter. Either there is some object that exists within a certain temporal border or there is not. I grant that the three dimensionalism can agree that such an object exists, but can argue that the object is not a part of the persisting object. The two theories might then come out as equivalent if it were construed as a debate about what it is to be a part of an object. In this case, however, the issue is about whether there is some object that exists during a period of time T and overlaps a persisting object at that time, not whether or not that object is a temporal part. See McCall (1994) pp. 215-216.
[Foot Note 3_19]
As for instance McKinnon (2003) strongly argues.
[Foot Note 3_20]
Parsons (2000).
[Foot Note 3_21]
See for example Merricks (1999).
[Foot Note 3_22]
Where being temporally fundamental is either being instantaneous, or being of the shortest possible temporal length eg. Planck length if it is not possible to be instantaneous.
[Foot Note 3_23]
Cf. Unger (1979) and Unger (1990).
[Foot Note 3_24]
Cf. van Inwagen (1990).
[Foot Note 3_25]
Cf Johnston (1987) and Haslanger (1989).
[Foot Note 3_26]
Lewis (1986) pg. 204.
[Foot Note 3_27]
Markosian (1998).
[Foot Note 3_28]
The example of Tibbles the cat is found in Geach (1980) section 110, but is formally the same as the case of Dion and Theon originally created by Chryssipus, a stoic philosopher in 280-206 BC. A discussion of the Dion and Theon problem can be found in Burke (1994).
[Foot Note 3_29]
Cf. Baker (1997); Simons (1987); Thomson (1998).
[Foot Note 3_30]
van Inwagen (1981).
[Foot Note 3_31]
van Inwagen (1981) pg .191.
[Foot Note 4_1]
Kim (1997, 2000).
[Foot Note 4_2]
Kim (2000) p. 46.
[Foot Note 4_3]
See, e.g., Kim (1989).
[Foot Note 4_4]
Kim (2000) pp. 54-6. Note: strictly speaking, this strategy is designed only for those mental properties amenable to functionalization.
[Foot Note 4_5]
Kim (2000) p. 37.
[Foot Note 4_6]
Kim (1997) p. 290. See also Kim (2000) p. 20.
[Foot Note 4_7]
Kim (2000) p. 54
[Foot Note 4_8]
Kim (2000) p. 111. See also Kim (1997) p. 295.
[Foot Note 4_9]
See also Kim (1997) p. 295 and Kim (2000) p. 116.
[Foot Note 4_10]
Kim (2000) p. 116.
[Foot Note 4_11]
Kim (2000) p. 41.
[Foot Note 4_12]
Kim (1999) p. 337.
[Foot Note 4_13]
Kim (1999) p. 344. Lewis (1986, p. 250) argues that even taking the constitutive substance to be essential is problematic.
[Foot Note 4_14]
They could, of course, be constant functions.
[Foot Note 4_15]
Lewis (1986) p. 251.
[Foot Note 4_16]
E.g., trope-theoretical attempts to re-construct properties (i.e., types) as classes of resembling tropes.
[Foot Note 4_17]
I suppose one could insist that x does bear P at w2, but in a non-P-ish manner.
[Foot Note 4_18]
One might, of course, simply reject type-token modal co-variance and concede that any reduction of types to tokens, or vice versa, is a non-starter.
[Foot Note 4_19]
This general strategy is defended in Robb (1997) and Robb and Heil (2003), and is criticized in Noordhof (1998), although the issue is framed in terms of tropes rather than in terms of substance-property-time complexes.
[Foot Note 4_20]
Lewis (1980).
[Foot Note 4_21]
My focus here is on core realizers rather than total realizers. Presumably, distinct mental properties will often (normally?) share total realizers. As a result, they are not even candidates for standing in identity relations with mental properties.
[Foot Note 4_22]
True identity statements can, of course, be contingent, but not the identities themselves.
[Foot Note 4_23]
Ehring (1999, p. 24) argues that mental tokens and their realizing physical tokens cannot be identical on Kim's picture because the constituent properties of mental tokens are properties of events whereas the constituent properties of realizing physical tokens are properties of the constituent substances of these same events. Although this criticism is prima facie compelling, it can I think be met by insisting that the constitutive property of an event is automatically part of the character of that event.
[Foot Note 4_24]
One might again worry that the bearers of mental properties are events and the bearers of their realizing physical properties are the constituent substances of events. But see note # 23 above.
[Foot Note 4_25]
Kim (1989).
[Foot Note 4_26]
One might attempt to avoid this latter worry by restricting the supplementation to intrinsic properties, but since functional properties are relational, this would not suffice to secure the efficacy of the mental.
[Foot Note 4_27]
Of course, the bearer of this 2nd order property will presumably have such powers.
[Foot Note 4_28]
Kim (2000) p. 54.
[Foot Note 5_1]
«Principii di logica matematica,» Rivista di matematica, 1 (1891): 1-10. See also note 5 to the article.
[Foot Note 5_2]
In this connection, see for example Donald Nute, Topics in Conditional Logic (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980) 85.
[Foot Note 6_1]
Frege (1950: 65).
[Foot Note 6_2]
i.e. Frege (1950).
[Foot Note 6_3]
For a throughout interpretation of Frege, see e.g. Dummett's works (1981, 1983, 1991). For Frege's logic, see Bocheñski (1961: 291-292, 320-322 et al.). In this paper we will focus on the philosophical issue and not on exegesis of Frege's writings (which, even though clearly written, are obsolete and sometimes ambiguous, and hence prone to differing interpretations). Nor will we touch upon any related issues, such as whether Frege was a realist or a nominalist -- see papers in Klemke (1968), Biriukov (1964), or for implications of the definition of existence for traditional metaphysics -- see Angelelli (1967: 225-227).
[Foot Note 6_4]
This is proven by Wells (1954: 537 ff). It would suffice to support it by recalling the vast literature devoted to Frege's ontology, notably Cocchiarella (1972: 181 ff), Klemke (1968), and the monograph by Williams (1981).
[Foot Note 6_5]
Forgie (1972: 254-256) gives an exceptionally lucid account of this, which we will thus follow in this section. Also see e.g. Walker (1965: Ch. 2.), Grossmann (1969: Ch. 2.), Munitz (1981: 82-104). References to relevant passages in Frege can be found there.
[Foot Note 6_6]
Forgie (1972: 254). The following definitions of A-, B1- and B2-expressions are due to Forgie as well.
[Foot Note 6_7]
Which has been introduced by Ajdukiewicz (1935).
[Foot Note 6_8]
See e.g. Biriukov (1964: 25 ff) on saturation.
[Foot Note 6_9]
Munitz (1981:98-99) following Dummett (1973: 262).
[Foot Note 6_10]
Of course, `thoroughbred horses' is a saturated concept, and an A-expression, obtained from the unsaturated first-order concept, the function ` ---- is thoroughbred', which is a B1-expression.
[Foot Note 6_11]
Frege (1950: 59, 64).
[Foot Note 6_12]
Frege (1950: 65). See also wider exposition in Williams (1981: Ch. 3.) and comparison with other definitions of existence in Labenz (1999: 3-4).
[Foot Note 6_13]
Frege (1950: 59, 64).
[Foot Note 6_14]
Labenz (1999: 3).
[Foot Note 6_15]
For a good analysis of `Plato's Beard' problem (which originates from Plato's Parmenides), see Jadacki (1981) and Williams (1981: 37-41).
[Foot Note 6_16]
This ought to be reflected in the model (of logic) of an ontology using this concept.
[Foot Note 6_17]
Grossmann (1969: 69-70) recognizes the problem, claiming that Frege confuses the two possibilities: asserting the existence of a concept and of an object.
[Foot Note 6_18]
Munitz (1974: 78-80).
[Foot Note 6_19]
Ibidem.
[Foot Note 6_20]
Fowler in The Modern English Usage calls German a thoroughbred language.
[Foot Note 6_21]
An exception will be pointed at in the next section.
[Foot Note 6_22]
Munitz (1974: 78).
[Foot Note 6_23]
Frege (1950); see Labenz (1999: 1-3).
[Foot Note 6_24]
Like `identical with itself', `thoroughbred or not thoroughbred', etc. In Polish there is a proverbial expression for that: `buttery butter'.
[Foot Note 6_25]
See Williams (1981: 17-41), Shaffer (1962: 309-311).
[Foot Note 6_26]
Commonly at least; and while rightly so about Kant, we will consider whether rightly about Frege, too.
[Foot Note 6_27]
Munitz (1974), Williams (1981).
[Foot Note 6_28]
A classic text on this widely-discussed issue is Moore (1936); a interesting treatment is given by Sommers (1973).
[Foot Note 6_29]
This objection has been raised by Forgie (1972: 259-261) and Grossmann (1969: 67-69). Walker (1965: 32) ignores it, apparently not regarding it as a problem at all, quite counterintuitively. Munitz (1974: 78-85) soothes the problem away, on the ground of quantifier interpretation of Frege's definition of existence, reducing it into the Russelian theory of descriptions.
[Foot Note 6_30]
Of course this would be an answer somewhat in the manner of Russelian theory of descriptions; Russell (1905). See Munitz (1974: 84-86).
[Foot Note 6_31]
One might try some exquisite word-constructions to save Fregean approach here, e.g. analyse `something' as `whatever thing', `whatever ----' being a B1-expression. However, this seems quite unfeasible.
[Foot Note 6_32]
Forgie (1972: 260); the passage referred to there is Frege (1960: 108).
[Foot Note 6_33]
Wirklich.
[Foot Note 6_34]
Frege (1960: 50); see Grossmann (1969: 64-68) for a discussion of this view in relation to Russell and Moore.
[Foot Note 6_35]
Williams (1981: 81-107).
[Foot Note 6_36]
Williams (1981: 106).
[Foot Note 6_37]
As Leszek Kolakowski has once noticed, it is a common fate of all the philosophical problems of past twenty five centuries than no party is ever convinced by the opponents' arguments.
[Foot Note 6_38]
Forgie (1972: 259). Forgie names this claim `principle P'.
[Foot Note 6_39]
In Proslogion Ch. 2 and Ch. 3 -- Anselm (1979); the distinctness of the proofs is shown by Malcolm (1960).
[Foot Note 6_40]
Some of these are Kolodziejczyk (1998), Kelly (1994), Tichý (1979), Adams (1971), Plantinga (1966).
[Foot Note 6_41]
As opposed to `in thought', so simply -- which exists.
[Foot Note 6_42]
Thus Plantinga (1966: 538).
[Foot Note 6_43]
This observation has been made by Forgie (1972: 251).
[Foot Note 6_44]
Then existence could be expressed by the quantifier, in the manner of Quine (1969), only the universe would have to include both real and intensional objects.
[Foot Note 6_45]
On the ground of the above-considered Frege's doctrine of existence, Plantinga's (1966: 54) `desultory gesture' against Frege in terms of problems with non-existents is quite besides the point.
[Foot Note 6_46]
E.g. Allen (1961: 59).
[Foot Note 6_47]
Allen (1961: 61-63). Unfortunately, most of his argumentation is based on premises we have not granted, or otherwise doubtful.
[Foot Note 6_48]
Somewhat inspired by Allen (1961: 62), but we have changed the argument significantly.
[Foot Note 6_49]
Mavrodes (1966).
[Foot Note 6_50]
Cocchiarella (1969).
[Foot Note 7_1]
Page references to Lewis are to David Lewis, «Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem,» Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8, No. 3 (1979): 235-240.
[Foot Note 7_2]
Robert Nozick, «Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice,» in Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem, ed. Richard Campbell and Lanning Sowden (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 1985), p. 107.
[Foot Note 7_3]
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984), p. 9. References to Axelrod are to this volume.
[Foot Note 7_4]
Gregory Kavka, «Space War Ethics,» Ethics 95 (1985): 673-91.
[Foot Note 7_5]
It should be noted that national disarmament of nuclear weapons is a process, when it disarms, a nation «builds down» its nuclear arsenal. Such a process can be reversed, thus a nation disarming in not similar to, e.g., a cornered outlaw «throwing out his weapon» to the surrounding police. The latter is, perhaps, the last play of a game, the former involves numerous plays, it is similar to an iterated PD. The importance of this point was suggested to me in discussion with my cousin, economist Peter Woodward.
[Foot Note 7_6]
For example, if the agent makes the decision 10 times, each time following Lewis's strategy of taking the thousand and the predictor is 60% accurate, the player will receive $4 million, 10 thousand dollars. But if the player foregoes his thousand each time and the predictor is 60% accurate, the player will receive $6 million; that is $1.99 million more. If, on the other hand, the predictor is 90% accurate, the player will receive $7.99 million more by foregoing the thousand each time then he would by following Lewis's strategy and taking it.
[Foot Note 8_1]
This article is the result of research done at an NEH Summer Seminar at Virginia Tech, 1999. Special thanks are due to Deborah Mayo and the NEH Summer Seminar participants. I also thank Long Island University for granting me released time to write this article. In addition, an early version of this article was presented at Long Island University's Faculty Forum. I thank the faculty members present for their comments.
[Foot Note 9_1]
This example of an experimental hypothesis is admittedly rough. A more precise hypothesis is that coffee drinkers are more likely to develop cancer. I phrase the hypothesis this way for effect. If this is troubling to some readers, they can substitute the cube-shaped earth hypothesis discussed later in the paper.
[Foot Note 9_2]
See, for example, the discussion in Mayo (1997).
[Foot Note 9_3]
The appendix of this article has a step-by-step explanation of these calculations. These are also worked out in Mayo (1997) and Dorling (1979).
[Foot Note 10_1]
Williams, 1998.
[Foot Note 10_2]
Mertz, 2003.
[Foot Note 10_3]
Armstrong, 2001, 1997, 1989.
[Foot Note 10_4]
Loux, 2001, 1998.
[Foot Note 10_5]
Campbell, 1990, 1981.
[Foot Note 10_6]
Bealer, 1982.
[Foot Note 10_7]
Ehring, 2001.
[Foot Note 10_8]
Grossman, 1992.
[Foot Note 10_9]
McDaniel, 2001.
[Foot Note 10_10]
Zimmerman, 1997.
[Foot Note 10_11]
Lowe, 2002, 2001, 1998.
[Foot Note 10_12]
O'Leary-Hawthorne and Cover, 1998.
[Foot Note 10_13]
Butchvarov, 1979.
[Foot Note 10_14]
Moreland, 2001.
[Foot Note 10_15]
Van Cleve, 2001.
[Foot Note 10_16]
Casullo, 2001.
[Foot Note 10_17]
Vallicella, 2002.
[Foot Note 10_18]
Simons, 2000.
[Foot Note 10_19]
Jubien, 1997.
[Foot Note 10_20]
Lango, 2002.
[Foot Note 10_21]
Denkel, 1997.
[Foot Note 10_22]
Price, 2001.
[Foot Note 10_23]
Wolterstrorff, 1970.
[Foot Note 10_24]
Orilia, 1998.
[Foot Note 10_25]
Glouberman, 1975.
[Foot Note 10_26]
Gilmore, 2003.
[Foot Note 10_27]
Swoyer, 1999.
[Foot Note 10_28]
Schaffer, 2003.
[Foot Note 10_29]
I will use «substance» in this paper to denote any ordinary object that is not a property, that is not a bundle, and which exemplifies n-adic properties.
[Foot Note 10_30]
In addition to vindicating blob theory, the arguments of this article may vindicate a sort of atomism similar to the atomism that some of the ancient Greek philosophers might have been arguing for, where atoms were considered to be without attributes, without intrinsic nature, numerically distinct but metaphysically indiscernible.
If properties do not exist, then minds must invent experiences of properties in the mind in order to account for the experience of a reality one might believe to have properties. To my knowledge, this idea--the idea that the ordinary, commonsense, macroscopic reality of surfaces and patches of color is largely an invention of the mind in its incorrect representations of particulate reality--is in line with quantum theory, since quantum theory is mostly about empty space between particles, point-masses (which have no size, and thus no color), and so on.
Furthermore, on this account, any mind, also being a propertyless item, would be an atom (or an activity of a number of numerically distinct atoms, if propertyless atoms can be involved in activities.) The idea that a mind is a philosophic Greek atom is suggested by (though apparently not strictly argued for) by Yandell (1999, 114).
I will discuss these issues a bit more in parts of this article below, especially the conclusion.
[Foot Note 10_31]
It may be the case that some time down the road a philosopher will develop an entirely new theory of property possession which my arguments do not attack and thus blob theory's correctness is not vindicated after all. But since there is, to my knowledge, no such alternative theory of property possession in the works, I ignore this possibility in this article.
[Foot Note 10_32]
What I mean by extreme nominalism (EN) is given by Armstrong:
[Foot Note 10_33]
Moreland, 2001, 74. Notice that Moreland refers to concrete particulars as simples in blob theory. This will be discussed more in the conclusion where I discuss that blob theory leads to a specific sort of philosophic atomism.
[Foot Note 10_34]
Maddy, 1990, 273.
[Foot Note 10_35]
O'Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens, 1995, 143.
[Foot Note 10_36]
Unger, 1980, 517.
[Foot Note 10_37]
For a discussion on many of these issues to do with the opposition quantum physics has with the concepts of space, time, distance, and motion, see Quentin Smith (2003). Also, the theory of atomism I argue for late in this article may also not involve time, space, distance, and motion.
[Foot Note 10_38]
Petitot and Smith, 1997, 233. In their article, Petitot and Smith attempt to argue against the position that quantum mechanics is strongly opposed to common sense.
[Foot Note 10_39]
Greene, 1999, p. 232.
[Foot Note 10_40]
Greene, 1999, p. 379
[Foot Note 10_41]
Or, as I will argue in the conclusion, there are numerically distinct unstructured (propertyless) entities that are metaphysically indistinguishable--such as in some ancient accounts of atomism.
[Foot Note 10_42]
I argue for the position that Western metaphysics leads to the position that reality can only be composed of one entity in two other articles (Grupp forthcoming), and where I use entirely different arguments than those used in this paper.
[Foot Note 10_43]
In the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 562-63, Butchvarov describes what is meant by «metaphysical realism»:
Metaphysical realism, in the widest sense, [is] the view that (a) there are real objects (usually the view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist independently of our experience or our knowledge of them, and (c) they have properties that enter into relations independently of the concepts which we understand them or of the language with which we describe them. Anti-realism is any view that rejects one or more of these theses, though if (a) is rejected the rejection of (b) and (c) follows trivially...
In discussion of universals [properties], metaphysical realism is the view that there are universals...
[Foot Note 10_44]
See endnote 30.
[Foot Note 10_45]
One article, by a philosopher, that discusses issues to do with the conflict disagreement quantum theories and ordinary experience, is Quentin Smith, 1997.
[Foot Note 10_46]
A second reason why I consider my passing over any discussion of the issue that the philosophy of propertylessness is weakened by its disagreement with common sense reality, or by its inability to explain how humans have experiences of objects that have properties, is given as follows. Similar to the philosophy of propertylessness, it is widely discussed in the literature that philosophers of mind (connectionism, dualism, identity theory, etc.) cannot explain specifically why or how humans have experiences of properties--for example, it is not known how neural mechanics can give rise to qualia. For this reason, there is no reason to consider the position that there are no n-adic properties as weakened any more or less than any of the philosophies of mind due to this lack of explanation. The problem that blob theory is apparently unable to describe how or why humans seem to have experiences of ordinary objects that have properties is no more a problem for any of the philosophies of mind that it is for blob theory.
[Foot Note 10_47]
This is the way physicists often refer to the electron or quark, as being structureless, since they have no evidence for its having any parts, or, as they say, they have no evidence for it having any internal structure. See Kane, 2000, 22.
[Foot Note 10_48]
See Lowe, 2001 for discussion on properties as «ways».
[Foot Note 10_49]
For a good example of a philosopher that makes a point of talking about bundles as substances, see Glouberman, 1975.
[Foot Note 10_50]
If the properties of the non-bundle substance were not tied to a non-property, then they would be tied to a property, and the non-bundle substance would be a bundle. So on the non-bundle account, the properties must be held by a non-property.
[Foot Note 10_51]
Armstrong, 2001, 78-79.
[Foot Note 10_52]
Loux, 1998, 117-118.
[Foot Note 10_53]
See Oaklander, 1978 for a paper that discusses bundle platonist theories.
[Foot Note 10_54]
Loux, 1998, 46. There is one more major branch of analytic metaphysics, which is the trope bundle theory. But I did not make mention of it above, since I already made mention of bundle theory, and the majority of bundle theorists are trope theorists.
[Foot Note 10_55]
Loux, 1998, 38-41.
[Foot Note 10_56]
Heil, 1998, 177-78.
[Foot Note 10_57]
Armstrong, 1989, 96-97.
[Foot Note 10_58]
Here I am referring to properties as «entities». I mean to use the word «entity» in the broadest possible sense, and in the way that many other realists refer to n-adic properties as entities (for example, Moreland (2001, 13), Lowe (2002, 16), and many others).
[Foot Note 10_59]
Platonistic properties can allegedly be unexemplified (unborne). It is unclear to me how they can be unborne and yet be ways.
[Foot Note 10_60]
Loux discusses the connection between property and particular using the word «link» in Loux 1998, 38-41.
[Foot Note 10_61]
First-order properties are not properties of other properties, but are properties of things. It is the first-order properties of non-bundle substances that tie to an internally bare particular in order to constitute a thing (lion, planet, etc.). And it is the first-order properties of a bundle that tie to one another to give rise to a substance that is a bundle.
[Foot Note 10_62]
Loux, 1998, 118.
[Foot Note 10_63]
Armstrongian substances are widely discussed substances involving spatiotemporal, physical universals that are exemplified by a thick particular.
[Foot Note 10_64]
A thick particular is the entire complex of exemplified properties that constitute a substance. Armstrong: «Consider now a particular, not a particular considered in abstraction form all its properties, but the particular taken along with its non-relational properties. (This is a thick particular...) Let it be a particular that changes over time.» (Armstrong, 1997, 100)
[Foot Note 10_65]
Loux writes:
According to a very old tradition, ontologists have another option: they can take concrete particulars themselves, or at least some among them, to be basic or irreducibly fundamental entities. On this view, having complexity of structure is compatible with being a basic or underived entity. The tradition is one that can be traced back to Aristotle... [A]t least some concrete particulars, living beings--plants, animals, and persons--[are considered by this tradition] as fundamental entities that cannot be reduced to more basic entities. Philosophers in this Aristotelian tradition reject the constructivist approach to concrete particulars that underlies both the substratum and bundle theories. As they see thing, the ontologist is not to construct the concept of a concrete particular from antecedently given materials... On this view, the ontologist cannot get below the concept to of a concrete particular, and both the substratum theorist and bundle theorist are mistaken in thinking that they succeed in doing so. (Loux, 1998, 117-118)
[Foot Note 10_66]
Loux, 1998, 120-21.
[Foot Note 10_67]
Armstrong, 1997, 123-125.
[Foot Note 10_68]
Another passage from Loux, where he uses different reasoning than I have used above, shows that a thin particular account of non-bundled substances must be an internally bare particular account.
[W]hat kinds of things function as constituents of concrete particulars? We have already mentioned the attributes--the properties or tropes--that are associated with a concrete particular as its constituents. Is there anything else that enters into the constitution of a concrete particular? One influential view insists that among the constituents of any concrete particular there is a quite different sort of thing--something that is not an attribute, but functions as the literal bearer, possessor, or subject of the attributes associated with the concrete particular. On this view, then, there are two different kinds of entities that enter into the constitution of any concrete object: the various attributes associated with the concrete object and something that functions as the literal bearer or possessor of those attributes...
...[N]either the attributes that actually are nor those that could have been associated with [a concrete particular, such as, a] ball [call it s,] can figure in the identity of s. Might some other attributes do so? If they do, they must be attributes related to s in the way that the attributes associated with the ball are related to the ball, as constituents to wholes. But, then, these new attributes need a subject or bearer; and just as the ball could not be a subject for these new attributes. What we need, then, is a subject in our subject, a constituent of s, that will function as literal bearer of the attributes that are supposed to fix s*s identity. But what attributes will fix the identity of our new subject (s*)? Obviously, not the new attributes for which it is subject. It looks as though the only way attributes could fix the identify of s' is for s' to be a further whole made up of still further constituents; and obviously we are off on an infinite regress, a regress that can be avoided only by conceding that there are subjects for attributes whose identity involves no attributes whatsoever. And since we must concede that subjects whose being the things they are involves no attributes make their appearance at some point in our analysis, we are best advised to make this concession for s itself and thereby eliminate the need for new and intrusive subjects like s* and its descendants. But if we do, we are committed to the view that each familiar concrete object is a whole whose constituents include, first, the attributes whose «being» or identity involves no attributes. Philosophers have given a special name to this subject; they call it bare substratum... The points of the label should be clear. The constituent in question stands under or supports attributes, but its being the thing it is involves no attributes. (Loux, 1998, 95-97)
[Foot Note 10_69]
Moreland, 2001, 155.
[Foot Note 10_70]
Davis, 2003, 538.
[Foot Note 10_71]
Moreland and Pichavance, 2003, 3-4.
[Foot Note 10_72]
Armstrong, 2001, 79.
[Foot Note 10_73]
Typically, an entity is considered to be that which possesses properties, and something that does not possess properties is considered to not exist, and not to be something that can be coherently referred to in any way. I will however refer to propertyless entities as «entities» due to the fact that I see no reason why I cannot broaden the category of entity to include new class: those items which are propertyless. The bare particulars, and perhaps predicating ties (if predicating ties are propertyless) discussed by many philosophers would be members falling into that class of entity.
[Foot Note 10_74]
Armstrong apparently agrees with this: «They [bare particulars] may be conceived of, or at least imagined, as points, whether spatial points or as spacetime points.» (Armstrong, 1997, .86) this was also mentioned by Moreland in the passage above.
[Foot Note 10_75]
They are partless since they are devoid of any part-whole relations, such as the relation, parthood, which is a polyadic property.
[Foot Note 10_76]
One may object that there are no properties above the first order. This is a position called elementarism: the position that there are only first-order properties (See Hochberg, 1978, p. 324; Bergman, 1958). On this account, first-order properties are propertyless entities, for the following reasons. First-order properties are properties of things (moving at velocity v, locatedness, concreteness, etc.), and if Elementarism is true, there are no second-order properties, properties that are properties of properties, such as relationhood (i.e., being a relation), locatedness, abstractness (or perhaps concreteness), and so on. According to this account, a lion, L, which has the property goldenness (first-order), which, on the metaphysical realist scenario, is a property that is itself not a property, since «not a property» denotes second-order property. The correct statement, according to the elementarist, would apparently be, «the property goldeness is propertyless», where «propertyless» (somehow) does not denote the property, propertylessness. It is not true that the property goldenness is a property (first-order property italicized, second-order property italicized and underlined) of L property, since it is not true that goldenness has the property propertyhood. Accordingly, Elementarism leads to the conclusion that it is not true that the L has properties. Elementarism leads to the conclusion that there are no things (bundles). This appears to show Elementraism is contradictory, since it is a theory that hold is that first order properties are not properties and things that have first-order properties do not have properties.
[Foot Note 10_77]
Loux, 1998, p. 99.
[Foot Note 10_78]
Ehring has lucidly discussed the issue that compresence is not an ordinary member of a bundle (i.e., not a property):
...[T]he properties included in the bundle are co-instantiated or compresent. The co-instantiation relation, C, is not a member of the bundle [i.e., the co-instantiation relation is not compresent with the properties of the bundle it bundles]... If we include C without modifying the formulation, then C itself is co-instantiated with the remaining tropes [properties]: co-instantiation is co-instantiated with the [bundle] FGH. But that either makes no sense or lead to infinite regress. An alteration of the original formulation is necessary... (Ehring, 2001, 165.)
[Foot Note 10_79]
I discuss this issue much more in another article (Grupp, 2004b).
[Foot Note 10_80]
Ehring has lucidly discussed the issue that compresence is not an ordinary member of a bundle (i.e., not a property):
...[T]he properties included in the bundle are co-instantiated or compresent. The co-instantiation relation, C, is not a member of the bundle [i.e., the co-instantiation relation is not compresent with the properties of the bundle it bundles]... If we include C without modifying the formulation, then C itself is co-instantiated with the remaining tropes [properties]: co-instantiation is co-instantiated with the [bundle] FGH. But that either makes no sense or lead to infinite regress. An alteration of the original formulation is necessary... (Ehring, 2001, 165.)
[Foot Note 10_81]
Since Peter van Inwagen's book Material Beings, philosophic atoms (basic building blocks), such as those discussed by the Presocratic Greeks (Democritus, etc.) are now usually called «physical simples». «mereological simples», or «material simples». There is much current dialogue in the literature on this issue from such philosophers as Merricks (2001), Markosian (1998), Hudson (2001), McDaniel (2002, 2003), Zimmerman (1996a, 1996b), and several others.
[Foot Note 10_82]
Armstrong 1997, 86.
[Foot Note 10_83]
Stroud, Barry, 2000, The Quest for Reality, Oxford University Press: New York, pp. 8-9.
[Foot Note 10_84]
Some might wonder how an atom can be in motion without having a property, such as the property being in motion. I too feel this may be a problem. It could be solved if one merely endorsed an ancient Buddhist atomism rather than an ancient Greek atomism; there may be many reasons for doing this, not just in order to bring ones theory of atomism into accord with blob theory.
On the Buddhist account, the problem of change and of identity over time (often discussed in the endurance and perdurance debate) are taken so seriously that real mind-independent change and identity over time are rejected, and instead, change and identity over time are considered an imaginary fiction created by the mind. Buddhists hold that if change could occur, it could only do so if an object m vanished out of existence and a copy of it m* came into existence. This sounds preposterous to many non-Buddhist metaphysicians, but it is widely known that it might be the case that philosophers cannot explain change and identity over time. If that is the case, the Buddhist position could be more coherent than the accounts of endurance and perdurance, if the Buddhist account involves fewer problems. But on the Buddhist account, there is no real motion or change, there is only one instant that is replaced, but all that ever exists is one moment that is instantaneous and changeless. So motion never occurs, and unstructured philosophic atoms need not have the property of motion, even though a mind may believe it experiences matter in motion. (See Grupp 2005a.)
[Foot Note 10_85]
This position is held by Cohn and Varzi (2003), Hudson (2001), Kris McDaniel (2003), Roeper (1997), Quentin Smith (1993, 1995), and many others, and this is the standard view in relativity and quantum field theory.
[Foot Note 10_86]
To my knowledge, this is also a position held by many physicists (Herbert 1987, 61).
[Foot Note 10_87]
In this note, I will very briefly explain why I am using the concept of interaction of atoms here. Typically philosophers hold that ordinary composite objects are collections of atoms that are arranged a certain way (for a good example, see T. Merricks 2003), where atoms exist in a network of relations. The word «arrangement» denotes the network of relations that the atoms are in. But if the arguments of this paper are applied to matter and space, rather than to time (see Grupp, 2005b), it leads to the conclusion that there are no relations between non-identical atoms, or between non-identical chunks of space. If this is the case, then we can only account for structures in nature not by holding that structures are networks of interrelated atoms, but rather there is something else going on that is responsible for the existence of structures out of atoms. The only other way I can imagine that philosophic atoms give rise to structures in nature is by way of some sort of interaction among philosophic atoms, if the atoms are not interrelated.
[Foot Note 10_88]
I am grateful to Quentin Smith for a few helpful comments he gave when he read over parts of this paper.