Sorites (Σωρίτης), ISSN 1135-1349

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Issue # 20 — March 2008. Pp. 49-66

The Constitution Argument Against Conceptualism

In his Mind and World (1994) and elsewhere, John McDowell defends the view that the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, Conceptualism has not proved particularly popular with the philosophical community. The main reason for this lack of popularity is the fact that many of those interested in the relation between concepts and the contents of perceptual experience think that a version of the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which supposedly has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism, is valid and sound. In rough terms, the argument has as its conclusion that we do not possess concepts for all that is presented to us in perceptual experience at the level of detail at which things are presented to us. For instance, we are presented in perceptual experience with different shades of red, but we would have no concepts for such shades at the level of detail at which they are presented to us. That is, we might possess a concept for the general category to which the shades belong, a concept such as RED, but not for the specific shades of red presented to us.

However, proponents of Conceptualism think they are able to block the Fineness of Grain Argument. According to them, we might not possess general concepts for fine-grained properties at the level of detail at which they are presented to us, but we possess demonstrative concepts for fine-grained properties at this level of detail.

In this paper, I will grant proponents of Conceptualism that as a matter of fact we do possess demonstrative concepts for fine-grained properties at the level of detail at which they are presented to us. But I will argue that, even if this is the case, we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. For there is a valid and sound argument — that I will call the Constitution Argument — that has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. I present the Constitution Argument in section 4. In sections 4, 5 and 6 I show that the argument is valid and sound, in which case we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. However, before introducing the Constitution Argument, we need to have a better understanding of what Conceptualism amounts to, of the Fineness of Grain Argument and of the Conceptualist response to the argument. Sections 2 and 3 are dedicated to this task.

Now, what, exactly, is Conceptualism? What does it mean to say that the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual? Let us begin to address this question by considering a few quotes from McDowell's Mind and World, in which he presents his version of Conceptualism. He writes things like:

Experiences in general are states or occurrences in which conceptual capacities are passively drawn into operation (1994:30).

That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement … So it is conceptual content (1994:26/McDowell's italics).

Experiences have their content by virtue of the fact that conceptual capacities are operative in them (1994:66).

The idea then is that concepts are applied in perceptual experience (in McDowell's terms, «conceptual capacities are passively drawn into operation» in perceptual experience), and these concepts are constitutive of the contents of such experiences. That is, they give, or determine, the contents of perceptual experience. In terms close to McDowell's, it is in virtue of the fact that concepts are applied in perceptual experiences that experiences have a given content. If, in perceptual experience, I apply the concepts THAT THINGS ARE THUS AND SO, then what is presented to me in perceptual experience — the content of my perceptual experience — is that things are thus and so. The concepts I apply in experience are constitutive of the content of my experience.

Now, if this is the case, then Conceptualism can be construed as a thesis regarding what makes two contents of perceptual experience be identical. For if the concepts applied in perceptual experiences are constitutive of the contents of such experiences, then two contents of perceptual experience are identical if and only if the same concepts are applied in them in the same order. More schematically, we have the following thesis:

For any two perceptual experiences A and B, the content of perceptual experience A is identical to the content of perceptual experience B if and only if the same concepts that are applied in perceptual experience A are applied in perceptual experience B in the same order.

This, I take it, is the clearest way of stating the thesis of Conceptualism. For, given this formulation, it is easy to see how Conceptualism can be evaluated as being true or false. If it is possible that there are (or if there are as a matter of fact) differences in the contents of two perceptual experiences even though the same concepts are applied in the experiences, then Conceptualism is false. Or if it is possible that there are (or if there are as a matter of fact) no differences in the contents of two perceptual experiences even though different concepts are applied in the experiences, Conceptualism is again false. If it is not possible that such situations occur, then Conceptualism is true. So, given the formulation of Conceptualism as a thesis regarding what makes two contents of perceptual experience identical, one can easily see how Conceptualism can be evaluated as being true or false.

Now, opponents of Conceptualism typically argue against this position by stressing the fineness of grain of what is presented to us in perceptual experience. In doing this, they often appeal to a passage in Evans' Varietes of Reference (1982), in which he asks, in a rhetorical manner: «Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminate?» (1982:229).

Before me, for example, are arranged various objects with various shapes and colours, of which, it might seem, I have no concept. My desk exhibits a whole host of shades of brown, for which I have no names. The speakers to the sides of the computer are not quite flat, but have curved faces; I could not begin to describe their shape in anything like adequate terms. The leaves on the trees outside my window are fluttering back and forth, randomly, as it seems to me, as the wind passes over them.- Yet my experience of these things represents them far more precisely than that, far more distinctively, it would seem, than any characterization I could hope to formulate, for myself or for others, in terms of the concepts I presently possess. The problem is not lack of time, but lack of descriptive resources, that is, lack of the appropriate concepts (2000:489-90).

The idea, then, is that, in perceptual experience, we are presented with fine-grained properties, such as very specific shades of colour, or very specific shapes. A single object, such as a desk, may be perceived as having different shades of brown, for instance. And, according to Heck, we have no names for such shades of colour. In fact, we have no appropriate, or, as I shall put it, no adequate concepts for such shades. That is, we have no concepts for such shades at the level of detail at which they are presented to us in perceptual experience. For instance, for a certain shade of brown that is presented to us, we possess a concept for the general colour category it belongs to. We possess the concept BROWN. But, according to Heck, we do not possess a concept for the specific shade of brown presented to us. We possess no concept under which only the specific shade of brown presented to us, and no other property in the neighbourhood, falls. Or, simply put, we possess no adequate concept for the shade of brown.

But why are we supposed not to have adequate concepts for fine-grained properties, such as shades of colour? In Heck's passage, it is suggested that we have no adequate concepts for fine-grained properties because we have no names for them. After all, he takes «lack of concepts» to be paraphrased in terms of «lack of descriptive resources».

Now, it is certainly the case that we do not have words for all the fine-grained properties that are presented to us in perceptual experience. I do not have words for all the shades of black that I see on my laptop. But does it follow from this that I do not have adequate concepts for such shades? Is the possession of concepts dependent on the possession of words that express them? This is certainly controversial. It seems prima facie plausible that one can possess certain concepts without having words to express them. And if this is possible, then why are we supposed not to have adequate concepts for fine-grained properties?

Some opponents of Conceptualism argue that the problem is not that we do not have words for fine-grained properties, but that we cannot recognize them. Tye, for instance, in arguing for the idea that we do not possess adequate concepts for fine-grained properties, says that «The ordinary person cannot recognize red₂₇ even after having just seen it» (2006:520). Thus, the idea is that, as fine-grained properties are presented to us, we do not take them, and are not capable of taking them, as being of the same type as properties presented to us in the past. And from this it is supposed to follow that we do not possess adequate concepts for such properties. If one cannot recognize red₂₇, then one does not possess the concept RED₂₇. Thus, what is in play here is the following requirement on the possession of adequate concepts for fine-grained properties, such as shades of colour:

In order to possess an adequate concept C for a fine-grained property P, one must be able to recognize P — that is, one must be able to take P as being of the same type as properties perceived in the past.

Given this requirement, if we are not able to recognize fine-grained properties, then we do not possess adequate concepts for such properties.

Let us assume for now that this is right, that we cannot recognize fine-grained properties, and hence that we do not possess adequate concepts for fine-grained properties, such as shades of colour. But if it is, then the following argument — let us call it the Fineness of Grain Argument — can be put forward:

(FG1) In perceptual experience, we are presented with fine-grained properties, such as shades of colour.

(FG2) We do not possess adequate concepts for fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience.

(FG3) Therefore, we do not possess adequate concepts for all that is presented to us in perceptual experience.

Now, notice that there are two main ways of reading (FG2), one weaker and one stronger. They are the following:

(FG2*) We do not possess adequate concepts for some of the fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience.

(FG2**) We do not possess adequate concepts for any fine-grained property presented to us in perceptual experience.

It is not clear if it is (FG2*) or (FG2**) that opponents of Conceptualism are committed to. But I think it is clear that what the opponents of Conceptualism should be committed is to (FG2*). For, if this claim is true, it already implies (FG3), and, consequently, the falsity of Conceptualism. I will explain why next. There is no need for the opponents of Conceptualism to commit themselves to the stronger claim made in (FG2**). So, I will be assuming that (FG2) is read in terms of (FG2*), as being the claim that we do not possess adequate concepts for some of the fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience.

Now, suppose that the Fineness of Grain Argument works. If it does, why is it supposed to be a threat to Conceptualism? Conceptualism, remember, is the following thesis:

Now, suppose that there are some fine-grained properties for which subjects have no adequate concepts. Suppose that two of these fine-grained properties are the shades red₂₄and red_25.Suppose, moreover, that a subject is, at time t, presented in perceptual experience with red_24.And suppose that, at time t1, the subject is presented in perceptual experience with red₂₅. Now, if the subject does not possess adequate concepts for these fine-grained properties, then, when she is presented with them in experience, she can only apply a non-adequate concept, such as RED, for the two shades. But there is a clear intuitive difference between the content of the perceptual experience of the subject at t and at t1. In fact, it seems absurd to deny that there is a difference. After all, at t the subject is presented with a given property in experience. At t1, the subject is presented with a different property. But this difference is not captured by the concepts applied in the experience by the subject, which are the same. If this is the case, then Conceptualism is false. After all, if Conceptualism were true, the fact that the subject applies the same concepts in two perceptual experiences would imply that their contents are identical. But if the Fineness of Grain Argument works, this is not true. For there will be cases in which the same concepts are applied in different experiences, but their contents will still be different. So, if the Fineness of Grain Argument works, it seems to have as a consequence the falsity of Conceptualism.

A major proponent of Conceptualism, Bill Brewer, has been unconvinced by the Fineness of Grain Argument. He responds to it in the following way:

There is an unacceptable assumption behind this line of argument, that concepts necessarily correspond with entirely context-independent classification of things, in such a way that they can, in principle at least, be grasped by anyone, anywhere, regardless of their current relations with the semantic values in question. This is what sustains the restriction upon the concepts available to capture subjects' perceptual discriminations of colours and volumes, in the examples given above, just to those associated with verbal expressions, like `scarlet' and `four cubic feet', which have content-independent norms of application. This restriction unacceptably rules out any appeal to context-dependent demonstrative concepts, though — concepts associated with expressions like «that shade of red» or «just that large volume», grasp of which essentially depends upon the subject's relations with the actual entities which constitute their semantic value … My reply [to the Fineness of Grain Argument] is that the fineness of grain in perceptual discrimination is matched precisely by the perceptual demonstrative concepts which the subject has in virtue of her conscious contact with the items in question. In other words, for any fineness of grain in perceptual content to which my opponent wishes to appeal in making his argument, the subject is capable of making a perceptual demonstrative judgement «that is thus», with just that fineness of grain. (1999:171-2/ Brewer's italics).

So, according to Brewer, the proponents of the Fineness of Grain Argument have wrongly supposed that the only adequate concepts we might have for the fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are general concepts. They have ignored the possibility that we might possess demonstrative concepts for the fine-grained properties presented to us.

Take a concept to be general only if it can be legitimately applied by a subject independently of any contextual relation between the subject and the objects or properties that fall under the concept. Thus, the concept RED is a general one because it can be legitimately applied by a subject independently of any contextual relation between the subject and the colour red. The subject need not be perceiving the colour to apply it, or be in any other relation to it. Unlike general ones, demonstrative concepts can only be legitimately applied given a certain contextual relation between the subject who uses it and the object or property that falls under the concept. It is typically taken to be a necessary condition for a subject to legitimately apply a demonstrative concept that the subject is perceiving the object or property that falls under the concept, and that in fact there is such an object or property before the subject.

Thus, in order to apply the concept THAT SHADE for a certain shade of colour, I must be perceiving it, and the shade must in fact be before me.

So, for a shade of colour such as black₂₄, for instance, we might not possess the general concept BLACK₂₄. From this, proponents of the Fineness of Grain Argument concluded that we do not possess adequate concepts for black_24,and for other fine-grained properties. But, according to Brewer, this does not follow. For we might well have non- general, demonstrative concepts, for fine-grained properties. For fine-grained shades of colour, for instance, we might possess the concept THAT SHADE. And, when applied before a given shade, such as black₂₄, the concept seems to refer to black₂₄ only, and to no other property in the neighbourhood. It seems, then, to be an adequate concept for the fine-grained property. And this should be the case in general. Brewer's point is that, for every fine-grained property presented to us in perceptual experience, we will have an adequate demonstrative concept for it.

If this is the case, then the second premise of the Fineness of Grain Argument is false. The premise states that

(FG2) We do not possess adequate concepts for fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience.

According to Brewer, we do. We possess adequate demonstrative concepts for every fine-grained property presented to us in perceptual experience. So, if Brewer is right, the Fineness of Grain Argument is unsound.

Let us assume here that Brewer is right, and that the Fineness of Grain Argument can in fact be blocked. But this does not settle the issue. For the fact that we possess adequate concepts for all the fine-grained properties and everything else presented to us in experience does not imply that Conceptualism is true. In order for this to be the case, we must not only possess adequate concepts for fine-grained properties and everything else presented to us in experience, but these concepts must be applied in perceptual experience, and be constitutive of the contents of perceptual experience. After all, Conceptualism is a thesis according to which the concepts applied in perceptual experience determine the contents of such experiences. Thus, the opponent of Conceptualism could try to argue that the concepts we possess for the fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are not constitutive of the contents of perceptual experience.

In the next section, I will present an argument along those lines, which I will call the Constitution Argument. If the argument works, as I will show that it does, then we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false, even if the Fineness of Grain Argument fails.

In this section, I introduce and clarify the Constitution Argument, which has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. The argument is the following:

(C1) If the adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are not constitutive of perceptual contents, then it is possible for the contents of two perceptual experiences A and B to differ even though the same concepts that are applied in A are applied in B.

(C2) The only adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are demonstrative concepts.

(C4) Thus, the adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are not constitutive of perceptual contents (from C2 and C3).

(C5) Therefore, it is possible for the contents of two perceptual experiences A and B to differ even though the same concepts that are applied in A are applied in B (from C1 and C4).

I take it that (C6) is clearly true. Conceptualism, remember, is the following thesis:

So, according to Conceptualism, it is not possible for two perceptual contents to differ if the concepts applied in the experiences do not differ. So, if (C5) is true, Conceptualism is false, as stated in (C6).

(C3) is the most controversial premise in the argument. In the following sections, I will try to show that it is true. (C2) is not obvious, but I think that we have good reasons to think it is true. Adequate concepts for fine-grained properties are generally taken to be either general or demonstrative. If a concept is general, it can be legitimately applied by a subject independently of any contextual relation between the subject and the objects or properties that fall under the concept. If a concept is demonstrative, it can only be legitimately applied given a certain contextual relation between the subject who uses it and the object or property that falls under the concept.

Now, in section 2, we presented the following requirement as being one that is usually adopted by those who put forward the Fineness of Grain Argument against Conceptualism:

In order to possess an adequate concept C for a fine-grained property P, one must recognize P — that is, take P as being of the same type as properties perceived in the past.

Now, it is a matter of debate whether this requirement holds both for the possession of adequate demonstrative concepts for fine-grained properties and for the possession of adequate general concepts for these same properties. People like Brewer (1999) and Chuard (2006) believe that this is only a requirement for the possession of adequate general concepts for fine-grained properties. Possession of demonstrative concepts for fine-grained properties would not depend on a capacity to recognize the property the falls under a concept. It should suffice that the subject is able to attend to the property, and to track it in space. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that this is the case. But the requirement could be modified in the following way:

In order to possess an adequate general concept C for a fine-grained property P, one must recognize P — that is, take P as being of the same type as properties perceived in the past.

Unlike the original Recognitional Requirement, I think the Recognitional Requirement for General Concepts does state a necessary condition for possession of adequate general concepts for fine-grained properties. In fact, it seems to be supposed by all sides of the debate that this is the case. Both opponents of Conceptualism, such as Tye, and Conceptualists, such as Brewer and McDowell, suppose that possession of adequate general concepts for fine-grained properties require a capacity to recognize such properties. The reasons are clear. Take a fine-grained property such as red₂₅. The idea here is that, in order to possess the concept RED₂₅, I must be able to recognize the shade. I must be able to take samples of red₂₅ as being of the same type as samples perceived in the past. And this seems to be true. Intuitively, if I possess information about red₂₅, but information that does not enable me to recognize the shade, I will still not possess an adequate general concept for it. For instance, knowing that red₂₅ is a colour, that it is a shade of red, that it is Mark's favorite shade of red, none of this seems to make it the case that I possess the concept RED₂₅. In fact, it seems that, unless I possess a capacity to recognize the shade, I do not possess an adequate general concept for it. Thus, it seems that the Recognitional Requirement for General Concepts does state a necessary condition for possession of adequate general concepts for fine-grained properties. And since all parties in the debate agree with this, we can safely assume it for purposes of argument here.

But, as it was mentioned earlier, we are not able to recognize every shade of colour presented to us, not even for a short while after the shades are taken from our view. For most shades, we are not able to tell if a shade presented five seconds after the presentation of the original shade is of the same type as the original shade or not. So, it seems to be an empirical fact that we are not able to recognize all the fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience. If this is the case, then, given the Recognitional Requirement for General Concepts, we do not possess adequate general concepts for all the fine-grained properties presented to us.

This leaves us with demonstrative concepts. In the last section, I granted Conceptualists that we do possess demonstrative concepts for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience. Let us go on assuming that this is the case. Now, there seems to be no reason for us to believe that we might possess adequate concepts for fine-grained properties which are neither general or demonstrative. Certainly Conceptualists have given us no reason to believe that there are such concepts. Thus, since we do not possess adequate general concepts for all fine-grained properties presented to us, there are good reasons to believe that the only adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us are demonstrative concepts (assuming that we do possess such concepts). Thus, I think there are good reasons to think that (C2) is true.

This brings us to (C1). I take (C1) to be clearly true, but it needs to be clarified. Why is it the case that, if the adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are not constitutive of perceptual contents, then it is possible for the contents of two perceptual experiences A and B to differ even though the same concepts that are applied in A are applied in B? To make things simpler, let us assume that the only adequate concepts we possess for all the fine-grained properties presented to us in experience are demonstrative concepts, as stated in (C2). The question then becomes: why is it the case that, if our demonstrative concepts for fine-grained properties are not constitutive of perceptual experiences, then it is possible for the contents of two perceptual experiences A and B to differ even though the same concepts that are applied in A are applied in B? The reason why this is so is fairly simple. Suppose that a subject A has a perceptual experience of a fine-grained property, such as of the shade red₂₄. And suppose that a subject B has a perceptual experience of slightly different shade of red — say, red₂₅. Now suppose that subject A applies the concept THAT SHADE in experience, which refers to red₂₄. And suppose that subject B applies in experience the concept THAT SHADE, which refers to red₂₅. Now suppose that these concepts, and all other demonstrative concepts, are not constitutive of the contents of the perceptual experiences of subject A and subject B. Thus, these concepts do not determine, or help to determine, the contents of the perceptual experiences of A and B. But one thing is for sure: the contents of the perceptual experiences of A and B differ. But since the concepts they apply in perceptual experiences are not constitutive of the contents of such experiences, what makes the contents different is surely not the fact that they apply different concepts in perceptual experience. Whatever makes it the case that their contents differ (the simplest option is to say that they differ because they perceive different properties), it is not the fact that they apply different demonstrative concepts in experience that makes this the case. For the demonstrative concepts they apply have no influence on which perceptual content the subjects are in.

If this is true, then it would make no difference for the perceptual contents of the subjects if they had applied the same demonstrative concepts in experience, or no concept at all. Since these concepts are not constitutive of perceptual contents, whether they are applied or not is irrelevant to the question of whether two perceptual contents differ or not. So, it might well be the case that, for any two perceptual contents that differ, this difference is accompanied by a difference in the demonstrative concepts applied by the subjects. But this has nothing to do with the fact that the contents differ. It is a mere contingency that every difference in perceptual content is accompanied by a difference in the demonstrative concepts applied by the subjects. For the perceptual contents would differ irrespective of whether demonstrative concepts are applied in experience or not. So, if the demonstrative concepts we possess for fine-grained properties are not constitutive of perceptual contents, then it is certainly possible for two perceptual contents to differ even though there is no difference in the concepts applied by the subjects in their perceptual experiences. If demonstrative concepts are not constitutive of perceptual contents, two perceptual contents can differ irrespective of which demonstrative concepts are applied in perceptual experience, and irrespective of whether demonstrative concepts are applied in perceptual experience at all. It is then possible for two perceptual contents to differ even though the same concepts are applied in the perceptual experiences, as stated in (C1).

So, I take it to be clear that (C1) is true. But in order to show that the Constitution Argument is sound, I need to show that (C3) is true. I need to show that demonstrative concepts, which, we have been assuming, are the adequate concepts we possess for all the fine-grained properties presented to us in experience, are not constitutive of perceptual contents. But before going into this, we have to discuss what demonstrative concepts refer to. This will quickly get us to (C3).

I take it that there are two options, and only two options, regarding what a demonstrative concept refers to. They are:

A demonstrative concept refers to an object or property before a subject according to the way this object or property is presented in the subject's perceptual experience.

In this section, I will argue that Conceptualists are forced to adopt Option 2. But, unfortunately for Conceptualists, Option 2 has as a consequence that demonstrative concepts are not constitutive of perceptual contents.

This is what I will show in the next section. But before going into any of this, we need to understand what is the distinction between Options 1 and 2.

This distinction can be made clear with an example. Consider the following shape:

Now, if we are sitting down with our head straight, this shade is perceived as a regular-diamond. But if we bend our body to the left (or right), the shape can be perceived as a square. And if we look at the shape with our head straight but it is moved to the right (or left), again we will perceive it as a square, as below:

Thus, shape 1 can be perceived in two different ways, depending on the position of our body relative to it, and depending on its orientation relative to us. Now, suppose that, in perceiving the shape, I entertain a thought that can be expressed by the English sentence «Seeing that shape relaxes me». The question is: What does the concept THAT SHAPE, applied in such a thought, refers to? In answering this question we will see how Option 1 differs from Option 2.

According to Option 1, THAT SHAPE will refer simply to the shape before me, no matter how the shape is presented in my perceptual experience. It will refer to a shape in the world that can be perceptually presented either as a regular-diamond or as a square.

But according to Option 2, THAT SHAPE will refer to the shape as presented in my perceptual experience. Right now, given that my body is straight, the shape is presented in my perceptual experience as a regular-diamond, and not as a square. Thus, according to Option 2, when I entertain the thought that can be expressed by the sentence «Seeing that shape relaxes me», the concept THAT SHAPE, applied in my thought, refers to the shape in the world as presented in my perceptual experience. Thus, THAT SHAPE refers to the shape above presented as a regular-diamond. It does not refer to the shape above presented as a square. Or, to put it another way, the concept THAT SHAPE refers to regular-diamonds and not to squares, although these are only two different ways in which a same shape can be presented in perceptual experience.

Having clarified the distinction between Option 1 and 2, which one should we adopt? I will argue that we are faced with a serious problem if we adopt Option 1, a problem that does not appear if we adopt Option 2. The problem is the following. Let us go on considering the example above. The shape above is presented in my perceptual experience as a regular-diamond, and, while perceiving it, I entertain the thought that can be expressed by the sentence «Seeing that shape relaxes me». In this case, I take my thought to be about the shape as it is presented in my perceptual experience, about a regular-diamond. In fact, my thought may not be true at all of squares. It might be the case that only when presented in my perceptual experience as a regular-diamond the shape above relaxes me. When it is presented as a square it does not. It might be the case that, when the shape is presented in my perceptual experience as a square, I get anxious. Suppose this is in fact the case.

Let us now suppose that Option 1 is true. If it is, then my thought expressed by «Seeing that shape relaxes me» is about both regular-diamonds and squares. After all, the concept THAT SHAPE, that I apply in thought, refers to the shape in the world, no matter how it is presented in my perceptual experience. Now, given this, then my thought expressed by «Seeing that shape relaxes me» could also be expressed by either of these two sentences:

Square shapes and regular-diamond shapes are, of course, the same shape. According to Option 1, my thought that can be expressed by «Seeing that shape relaxes me» is about the shape itself, no matter how it is presented in my perceptual experience. If this is the case, then my thought is about both squares and regular-diamonds, since they are, in fact, the same shape. Thus, given Option 1, my thought could be expressed both in terms of (1) and (2). Now, if this is the case, then although I am not aware of it, I am thinking what is expressed in (1) and (2).

But the problem is that my thought cannot be expressed in terms of (1). After all, (1) is false about me. Only when presented in experience as a regular-diamond does the shape in question make me relax. Presented the other way, as a square, the opposite reaction is caused in me: I become anxious. Thus, my thought is true only for the shape presented in experience as a regular-diamond. It is false for the shape presented as a square. This being the case, my thought cannot be expressed in terms of (1).

The problem can be put in general terms. Suppose that Option 1 is true. Then, there will be certain demonstrative thoughts T that are about a property P in the world that can be perceived in two different ways. There will then be cases in which, according to Option 1, T can be expressed in the ways E₁and E_2.The problem is that, in some cases, contrary to what should be the case given Option 1, T cannot be expressed in terms of E₁ or E₂.

I take this to be a serious problem, one that disfavors the adoption of Option 1 as an account of what demonstrative concepts refer to.

Option 2, of course, has no problem whatsoever with cases such as the one above. According to Option 2, my thought expressed by «Seeing that shape relaxes me» is about the shape as presented in my perceptual experience. It is, then, about regular-diamonds, and not about squares. Thus, according to Option 2, the sentence «Seeing regular-diamond shapes relaxes me» is a way of expressing my thought, since my thought that the shape in question relaxes me is precisely about regular-diamond shapes. In this case, my thought cannot be expressed as (1), as «Seeing square shapes relaxes me». According to Option 2, my thought is not about the shape presented in experience as a square, so my thought cannot be expressed in terms of (1).

So, Option 2 does not face the problem with things that can be presented in perceptual experience in different ways that Option 1 faces. I take this to be a strong reason for us to favor Option 2 instead of Option 1 as an account of what demonstrative concepts refer to. And, thus, I do not think Option 1 is a viable route for Conceptualists to take in giving an account of what demonstrative concepts, the concepts we possess for fine-grained properties, refer to. In order to avoid the problem above, Conceptualists should adopt Option 2.

But there is another reason why Conceptualists should avoid Option 1. Simply put, it seems that, if Option 1 is true, then Conceptualism is false. Let me explain why.

Now, in the same way that Shape 1 can be presented in experience either as a square or as a regular-diamond, shape 2 can be presented either as a non regular-diamond or as a parallelogram, as below:

This shape, a parallelogram, is the same shape as the non regular-diamond above, only orientated in a different way relative to the viewer, which leads to it being presented in experience in a different way. Now, it seems that at least most of us do not possess adequate general concepts for shapes such as these. Most of us do not possess words for them. Moreover, it seems that we would not be able to recognize such shapes. At least not in all their fineness of grain. We might be able to take a given shape as being a parallelogram. But this is not to recognize the shape in all its fineness of grain. For parallelograms can be of many sorts. An equilateral parallelogram is called a «rhombus». A rhombus with acute angles of 45 degrees is called a «lozenge». A rhombus with acute angles of 63.43 degrees is a golden rhombus. So, when we perceive a parallelogram, to recognize it as a parallelogram is not to recognize it in all its fineness of grain. For properties such as the degrees of its acute angles will make the shape in case a parallelogram of a given sort. And it seems unlikely that most of us would be able to identify such properties, and thus to recognize a parallelogram in all its fineness of grain, as being of a given sort. The parallel with the case of colour should be obvious. We are able to recognize a given colour as, say, red, but we are not typically able to recognize the specific shade of red perceived. The same goes to shapes. We might be able to recognize a given shape as a parallelogram, but it seems unlikely that we would be able to recognize which specific sort of parallelogram it is that we perceive.

Thus, it seems that we would not be able to satisfy the recognitional requirement for possession of adequate general concepts for such shapes. The requirement, remember, is:

In order to possess an adequate general concept C for a fine-grained property P, one must recognize P — that is, take P as being of the same type as properties perceived in the past.

Since we are probably not able to recognize the shape above in all its fineness of grain, then, according to the Recognitional Requirement, which is widely accepted, then we do not possess adequate general concepts for shape 2.

A Conceptualist might reply, at this point, that we may not possess adequate general concepts for shape 2, but we possess demonstrative concepts. We possess, for instance, the concept THAT SHAPE. Let us assume that this is the case. Let us also assume that such a concept can be applied in perceptual experience. And let us also assume that Option 1 above is true. That is, let us assume that a demonstrative concept refers to an object or property before a subject, no matter how it is perceived. Now, if this is the case, then the only adequate concept we possess, and thus the only we can apply for what we perceive in all its fineness of grain, when before shape 2, is the concept THAT SHAPE, which refers to the shape no matter how it is perceived.

So far, so good. Now suppose that there are two subjects, A and B, perceiving shape 2. Suppose that A perceives shape 2 as what we call above a non regular-diamond. And suppose that B perceives shape 2 as what we call above a parallelogram. But, like most of us, subjects A and B do not possess words or adequate general concepts for such shape. Thus, when before the shape, both subjects can only apply the concept THAT SHAPE, in order to capture what is perceived in all its fineness of grain. But I take it that it is uncontroversial that subjects A and B have perceptual experiences with different contents.

For A, the world is presented as having what we called above a non regular-diamond. For B, the world is presented as having what we called above a parallelogram. Thus, the contents of their perceptual experiences differ. But, and this is the important point, if Option 1 is true, then subjects A and B apply the same concept (type, not token) in perceptual experience. Both subjects A and B apply, when before the shape, the concept THAT SHAPE. Given Option 1, THAT SHAPE refers to the shape in the world, no matter how it is presented in the subject's experience. Thus, THAT SHAPE, when applied by subject A, refers to shape 2, not as a non regular-diamond, but to shape 2, no matter how it is presented in the subject's experience. And the same is the case with the concept THAT SHAPE when applied by subject B. It refers to shape 2, not as a parallelogram, but to shape 2, no matter how it is presented in the subject's experience. Thus, THAT SHAPE, when applied by subjects A and B refers to shape 2, no matter how it is presented in the subject's experience. So, the concept THAT SHAPE, applied by subject A, is the same concept (type) as THAT SHAPE, applied by subject B. So, subjects A and B, when before shape 2, apply the same concept. And there is no other concept at their disposal that could be applied instead for what is perceived in all its fineness of grain. Moreover, most of us would be in the situation of A and B, with no concept at our disposal but THAT SHAPE to apply when before shape 2.

However, if this is the case, then Conceptualism is false. For subjects A and B have perceptual experiences with different contents. But, given the truth of Option 1, they both apply the same concept (type) for shape 2. And they have no other concept at their disposal for what is perceived in all its fineness of grain. Thus, the content of the perceptual experiences of A and B are different, with no difference in concepts applied. But Conceptualism is the thesis according to which

However, if Option 1 is true, there can be (and there will be, given that the shapes such as 2 can be found in the world) perceptual experiences with different contents but with no difference in concepts applied. The problem is, of course, general, and not relative to shape 2. For any shape that can be presented in experience in different ways and for which we possess no adequate general concepts, we can only apply a demonstrative such as THAT SHAPE to them, if we are to apply an adequate concept to what is perceived. But, given Option 1, the concept THAT SHAPE will always refer to the shape in the world, no matter how it is presented in experience. If this is the case, then the same concept will be applied when a given shape is presented in experience to any two different subjects in two different ways. Thus, the contents of the perceptual experiences of the subjects will differ, with no difference in concept applied. If this is the case, then Conceptualism is false.

So, given that there are shapes that can be (and are) presented in experience in different ways, if Option 1 is true, then Conceptualism is false. So, not only Option 1 has the problem of obliging us to say that certain thoughts that we have can be expressed in certain ways, when they actually cannot be expressed in these ways, but also it has as a consequence that Conceptualism is false. So, it is not an option for Conceptualists to adopt Option 1 as an account of what demonstrative concepts refer to.

So, I take it that Conceptualists have to adopt Option 2 as an account of what demonstrative concepts refer to. Given Option 2, subjects A and B apply different concepts when before shape 2. THAT SHAPE, applied by subject A, refers to the shape presented as what we have called a non regular-diamond. THAT SHAPE, applied by subject B, refers to the shape presented as what we have called a parallelogram. Thus, THAT SHAPE, applied by subject A, refers to something different from what THAT SHAPE, applied by subject B, refers to. Thus, subjects A and B apply different concepts. And this is precisely the result that Conceptualists want. Different concepts are applied for perceptual experiences with different contents.

Conceptualists, then, have to take Option 2 as being their account of what demonstrative concepts refer to. However, if Option 2 is true, then demonstrative concepts are not constitutive of perceptual contents. This is what I will show next.

A demonstrative concept refers to an object or property before a subject according to the way this object or property is presented in the subject's perceptual experience.

Given Option 2, a demonstrative concept THAT SHAPE, applied by us before a given shape, refers to the shape in the world as presented in our perceptual experience, and not to the shape in the world no matter how it is presented to us. But, if this is the case, then the demonstrative concept is dependent on the content of perceptual experience. The demonstrative concept gets to be about something, and thus gets to be a given demonstrative concept, only given the content of perceptual experience.

I take this to be an undeniable consequence of Option 2. If Option 2 is true, then demonstrative concepts are dependent on perceptual contents, in the sense that a demonstrative concept only gets to be about something given the content of perceptual experience.

Now, this being the case, then demonstrative concepts cannot be constitutive of the content of perceptual experiences. If they were, then they would be at least part of what makes a given perceptual content the content that it is. A concept such as THAT SHADE, applied by me in perceptual experience, would be at least part of what makes the content of my perceptual experience the content that it is. In fact, if this were the only concept I apply in experience, then it would fully determine the content of the experience. It would be what makes the content of my experience the content that it is. So, if demonstrative concepts were constitutive of perceptual contents, then perceptual contents would be dependent on demonstrative concepts. But we have seen that demonstrative concepts are themselves dependent on perceptual contents. So, if demonstrative concepts were constitutive of perceptual contents, we would have that demonstrative concepts are dependent on perceptual contents and that perceptual contents are dependent on demonstrative concepts. This is, of course, viciously circular. It cannot be the case that demonstrative concepts are dependent on perceptual contents and that perceptual contents are dependent on demonstrative concepts. Something must give.

Since we have good reasons to think that Option 2 is true, and since Option 2 has as a consequence that demonstrative concepts are dependent on perceptual contents, then what must give is the idea that demonstrative concepts are constitutive of perceptual contents. Since demonstrative concepts are dependent on perceptual contents, they cannot also be constitutive of perceptual contents. As Peacocke puts it, since demonstrative concepts are «themselves individuated in part in terms of ways in which properties, magnitudes and relations are given in experience», they cannot «be used to elucidate the nature of such ways of being experienced» (2001:250).

So, I take it that demonstrative concepts cannot be constitutive of perceptual contents, as stated in (C3) of the Constitution Argument. The Constitution Argument, remember, is:

(C2) The only adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are demonstrative concepts.

(C4) Thus, the adequate concepts we possess for all fine-grained properties presented to us in perceptual experience are not constitutive of perceptual contents (from C2 and C3).

(C5) Therefore, it is possible for the contents of two perceptual experiences A and B to differ even though the same concepts that are applied in A are applied in B (from C1 and C4).

The argument is clearly valid. I have tried to show that it is also sound. If am right about this, then we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false.

In this paper, I have argued that, even if Conceptualists are able to block the Fineness of Grain Argument, Conceptualism still seems to be false. For, even if this is the case, Conceptualism is still subject to the Constitution Argument, which has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. I have argued that the argument is both valid and sound. If that is the case, we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false.

I wish to thank Stephen Laurence, Rob Hopkins, David Papineau and Dominic Gregory for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks are also due to Capes Foundation, for funding this research.

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