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UhNB4  p(AC!y.]8*C]\  PCP"9tE4-t\  PCqP#GWA\  PC P%GWA4  p(AC 9yE4-y4  p(ACqd6NCJX pTCdCaT11X pTCk1b;,b\  PCPD3rE:oRr2PAqP+D?WH[2PA Pi(P0$_P\  PCP<7sE4-s*f9 xCqX2lgbbibliograf1as  Xo)cr.ANELIA simple interl.DINA4 sans Npage ESES ,.,. 6&6&EstndarHPLASIII.PRSXh46&finitif@p@@FF MMx6&EstndarNELIA simple interl.DINA4 sans,+  # P7$P# ``dd      K< X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: #^JxP7^P# Contradictions and Paradigms  by Lorenzo Pe9a`"#F#Xw P7 XP#у   yFdddyN#W"^ vP)E 'P#X01Í ÍX01ÍÍ.  # -t\  PCqP#=) ) )  v   Contradictions and Paradigms:  v,  A Paraconsistent Approach   h # Lorenzo Pe9a  Z    R %Contents: ) 0." Introductory Remarks 1." Why Paradigm Variation is Ensuant upon Contradiction 2." How Externalistic Warrant Parries the Threat of [Truth] Relativism 3." Why Not to Ward Relativism off by Means of Foundationalistic Justification 4." Defending a relativistic View of Warrant 5." A Transcendental Argument against [Truth] Relativism 6." Towards [Partial] convergence 7." A Gradualistic Paraconsistent Way to Convergence 7.1." Perspectivism and NonCopulative Paraconsistent Logics 7.2." The Strength and Weakness of Two Copulative Approaches to Paraconsistent Logic 7.3." The Logic of Contradictorial Gradualism 7.4." Implementing the Notion of Relative Truth  RE 8." Bibliographic References   Z 3 v 0." Introductory Remarks ) The present paper argues that: (1) warrant relativism is true " any belief warrant is relative "; (2) [truth] relativism is false (not every belief can be true only as regards some particular entity or referencepoint); (3) there are valuable insights relativists have provided us with, one of them being the search for some kind of convergence; (4) a most convenient convergence policy can be articulated by applying a paraconsistent gradualistic (infinitevalued) logic, i.e. a logic which, by allowing degrees of truth and falseness, makes room for some beliefs being both [up to a point] true and yet [to some extent] false.   Z   1." Why Paradigm Variation is Ensuant upon Contradiction  ZJ ) By a paradigm variation (PV henceforth) I mean the cleavage between two or more belief frameworks, each of them characterized by its own rules or standards, its own values, and its own worldview " or at least, so to speak, its own patterns or guidelines as to what is going to count as an admissible worldview. There are basically two different ways of looking upon PV. According to one of them, such a variation entails incommensurability, while the other takes every such variation as an alternance between opposite, mutually contradictory,  Z$ beliefs.@$ ~Jq' ԍIt is extremely interesting, in that connection, to examine the relationship between the incommensurability thesis in the  ~J9( philosophy of science and relativism. See [Devitt, 1984]: 137ff. Devitt regards views such as Feyerabend's and Kuhn's as weakly relativist, insomuch as those authors seem to assume or agree that there are some entities whose existence is not relative to a theory or paradigm. I tend to look upon their kind of approach as more strongly relativist, though, since their assumption can best be held to be a concession for the sake of the argument. Devitt's objection against the incommensurability thesis, on pp. 151ff of the book, seems to me a little hasty or insufficient, even though I am most sympathetic to Devitt's thrust and purposes. On the relationship between meaningrelativism (the incommensurability thesis) and truth relativism " arguing for the latter on  ~J, the ground of the former " see [Margolis, 1985]: 171ff. Unfortunately both Margolis and other relativists fail to clearly distinguish,=o.o.o. these different kinds of relativism.$X=o.o.o.ԌThe former view can be argued for by stressing that, when two paradigms are present, face to face, what happens is not that something or other is both asserted within one of them and denied within the other, since the very sense of some questions and answers is relative to a paradigm or conceptual scheme or framework, so much so that in fact no thesis can be nonrelatively identified as remaining the same across the paradigm border. Although that way of putting the view may owe something to Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis,  Z surely the view is widely shared, albeit under different guises, by a number of relativists. X ~J ԍI have argued elsewhere that Quine's thesis is committed to truth relativism. See my two papers [Pe9a, 1989a] and [Pe9a, 1989b]. However, Quine's thesis does not lead to Kuhnian incommensurability, even if Kuhn himself occasionally seems to think it does. Quine's thesis, [truth] relativist though it is, entails that any alternative theories are commensurable, viz. under " or relatively to " some translation manual. But of course, Quine is in agreement with incommensurabilists in rejecting any nonrelative commensurability between conflicting theories. Quine is so to speak a reference relativist on a higher level: it is not the case that any two alternative theories always refer to different sorts of entities, which would lack theoryindependent existence; it is rather that whether they refer to the same entities or not is relative to a translation manual. On the other hand, it is widely agreed upon that Hilary Putnam's nonrealism is closely related to Quine's thesis, even if Putnam's arguments hinge more on modeltheoretic considerations than on the radical translation thoughtexperiment " but in the end they are quite close. Now, although Putnam has generally refrained from putting his case as a defense of ontological or alethic relativism " keeping on, even in his recent papers, inveighing against truth relativism " there is at least a place where, rebutting Davidson's transcendental  argument against conceptual  relativism, he has espoused a meaningrelativistic construal of his own latterdays epistemology, namely  ~JS [Putnam, 1987]: 6977. (In [Pe9a, 1989b] I discuss Davidson's shrinking from Quine's relativist conclusions, which is made possible by paying the price of renouncing reference altogether.) On the relationship between radical interpretation and relativism " with  ~J the scales tilted to this position " see [Collin, 1987]: 5363. For, even when some people set about discovering a PV by pointing to some fundamental presupposition which is held here and (at least implicitly) rejected there, they, more often than not, end up espousing meaning relativism. That sort of relativism claims that, each expression being endowed with a sense by its utterance context, which includes basic presuppositions, nothing is going to be asserted here and denied there with one and the same meaning, not even the presuppositions themselves " at least nothing the PV affects. Thus, the view we are now considering aims to find out what grounds any apparent assertion discrepancy between diverse paradigms. And it claims that the ground is an underlying incommensurability, the very fact that some questions arise within one of the confronting paradigms which are indeed meaningless within the other " or anyway they do not keep the same meaning there, or even their keeping it or failing to keep it is not nonrelatively definite or determinate, but varies according to translation manuals, for instance.  ZY As against such a view I want to argue that a PV consists in one [same]  basic  or  ZJ   fundamental  contention being held to be true here and either denied or rejected there. My argument is as follows. Even should a PV consist in some kind of meaning relativism, the only way we could learn that such a PV obtained would be by finding out that some presupposition or basic contention would be held here but not there " or that it was claimed to be true here but false there. Until this is the case, nothing debars us from devising credible translation manuals in virtue of which each sentence asserted by such people as adhere to one of the paradigms can be translated into one which makes sense to those adhering to the other, and conversely. What prevents us doing so is for us to come to know, or at least surmise, that some words do not convey the same meaning here and there. But how on earth can we be led to such9o.-- a conclusion if not by realizing that some assumptions which alone bestow a sense upon a word or expression are not commonly shared by both groups or communities? Now, if what allows us to reach such a conclusion is the fact that those assumptions lack even the possibility of being entertained or envisaged with the same sense by both groups, then an infinite regress would be triggered. (On the other hand, admittedly, a Quinean  version of meaningrelativism probably does not fall afoul of this argument; but it, too, is committed to countenancing that: (1) it makes sense " under some appropriate translation manual " to assign a belief to those hanging on to one of the paradigms and the rejection or denial thereof to those clinging to the other; and (2) that such is in fact the case " again from the viewpoint of a certain translation manual. Thus, even Quinean relativism calls for at least a possibility of adjudicating ascription of an explicit or implicit claim to the people here and of its denial or rejection to the people there.) But, then, satisfying ourselves that meaning relativism, or incommensurability, obtains needs our pointing to some identifiable divergence. Which entails that we can never find any widespread " or allencompassing, or allpervading " incommensurability, after all, since otherwise no divergence in basic opinions could take place. For, if most or many expressions undergo a meaning change across the paradigm border, it is hard to see how basic questions or beliefs could keep the same meaning. But then, if no widespread incommensurability is ever to be found, the hypothesis that there is some such incommensurability all the same is downright unverifiable. Although, to be sure, there are unverifiable truths, we cannot ever know that a certain unverifiable state of affairs does in fact exist. So we can never know that widespread incommensurability exists. But then the hypothesis that they do not exist becomes much more plausible, since it is simpler, more fruitful in explicative power and all in all more satisfactory. Now, if no such incommensurability exists, surely isolated purported incommensurability cases can be dealt with in such a way that they emerge as instances of a surmountable incommensurability " i.e. as such that those within one of the paradigms can hoist themselves to understanding the other group's claims by acquiring additional vocabulary learnable form their own. To sum up, no PV can exist unless there is some divergence or other between those clinging to one of the paradigms and those clinging to the other. Thus it is hard to figure out how a disparity correctly describable in terms of meaning relativism can in fact exist. The PVs meaningrelativists try to account for are best regarded as opinion divergences, i.e.  Zs as one same opinion being held here and either denied or rejected there. While rejection is not the same as denial, surely in most cases no claim is rejected unless it is denied and  ZU" no claim is strongly denied " i.e. no claim is such that its strong negation, or overnegation , is asserted (see last Section below) " unless it is also rejected. I'm not going to dwell on the nature of rejection here. Suffice it to agree on the correlation between strong denial and rejection. The foregoing discussion does not rule out truthrelativism, of course, which still remains compatible with whatever we have said. What thus far has emerged is that any PV involves a contradiction, in the sense of a belief being held (here) and either rejected or (whether strongly or simply) denied there. This is why going into some qualities of negation or denial, such as those paraconsistency (a notion to be explained in the last Section below) is concernedS*o.-- with, bears upon how PV is to be assessed and how truth" or assertionrelativism is to be canvassed.   Z 2." How Externalistic Warrant Parries the Threat of [Truth] Relativism ) We have seen that meaningrelativism " or the incommensurability thesis " is open to a cogent objection. But what about truthrelativism " the thesis that It is true that p  is always relative to some paradigm or other, to some framework or conceptual scheme, or historical circumstances or whatever? I shall discuss truthrelativism below. For the time being I'll try to assess some proposals  ZQ as to how to deflect the relativist's claims. The most outstanding proposal is externalism.@Q  ~J ԍExternalism has been increasingly in the air these last years. See for instance : [Alston, 1980] and [Alston, 1986]: 179222;  ~J [Goldman, 1986]; [Nozick, 1981]; [LuperFoy (ed.), 1987]. To the present writer's mind the best arguments against externalism  ~Jb to be found in press are those of Laurence BonJour in [BonJour,1985]. (Unfortunately, BonJour's brand of coherentism seems in the end to be committed to too many concessions to both externalism and internalistic foundationalism; see all the Section  ~J II of [Bender (ed), 1989].) A very nice discussion of externalism is made by Ernest Sosa in [Sosa, 1988]: 15388. My own discussion in this Section is aimed at Alston's externalism " my objections would need qualifications in order to apply to other externalistic accounts such as Nozick's, LuperFoy's, or Goldman's reliabilism. An interesting distinction between beliefand normexternalism  ~JJ (roughly a counterpart of the distinction between act" and ruleutilitarianism), is argued for in [Pollock, 1986]: 125ff. Let me begin by considering what the relativist threat consists in, i.e. what the [truth] relativist's main argument amounts to. The relativist argues that in order to believe something is true we need some warrant or other " unless we are so irrational as to go in for wholly unwarranted acts of faith; now, warrant is relative, since nothing is warranted, period. Warrant is always bestowed upon a belief by some other beliefs, or the like, and so on, whether in a circle or by means of an infinite regress, or finally starting from, or hinging on, a set of basic, warrantless beliefs, which are the grounding presuppositions making up the conceptual scheme. This means that no warrant lies on rocky, absolutely steadfast ground; or, more to  Z@ the point, that being warranted is no property of a belief: what instead exists is the relation  Z1 of being warranted by ; now, if warrant is relative, how can we assert that truth is nonrelative? Asserting that some belief " or sentence or whatever " is true is an act which calls for some warrant or other, and cannot sensibly or reasonably outreach the strength of the available warrant. Hence, truth is as relative as warrant is. Each warrant can be traced back to some kind of basic assumptions which can be taken for granted, whether provisionally or not. Likewise, each truth claim is to be taken as referring to those very same assumptions, or unchallenged grounding claims, which make up a horizon, or framework, or paradigm. Thus it is not a question of a contention being true or false, but of its being either true or false on the basis  Z of, or with respect to, a certain paradigm.x ~J~% ԍRelativists who clearly reason along those lines are not easy to pin down, relativism being in many cases a little hazy in its arguments. More often than not recentdays relativists have laid more store on considerations borrowed from [meta]sociology  ~J' and [meta]anthropology; see e.g. [Barnes & Bloor, 1982]: 2147. More philosophically minded relativists are more prone to argue  ~J' along lines as those I am entertaining now; see e.g. [White, 1983]; and [Margolis, 1982]: 917. See also [Meiland & Kausz (eds), 1982]. A refutation of the underlying relativist argument " from the existence of disagreements to the relativity of truth via the  ~Jf) relativity of warrant " is put forward in [Wainwright, 1986]: 4760. Moreover, a great deal of discussions about scepticism would apply to relativism, should the latter approach be taken much more seriously, as it ought to.Lo.--ԌAs against that line of argument, externalism emphasizes that warrant is nonrelative. For what endows a belief with warrant is not another belief, or set of beliefs, or the like,  Z but a warranting situation in the world. Such a situation may consist in a causal link between the fact the belief takes to exist and that very same belief; or it may consist in something different " for instance, the reliability of the method applied in garnering the belief, a reliability which may be spelled out as a high ratio of true beliefs out of the total set of beliefs the method leads to, in the world where it is being applied. But anyway the warranting situation gives the belief warrant whether the believer believes it or not, or at least its giving it warrant does not lie in the believer's being aware of the situation. The externalist claims that his view is the only one which can avoid a paradox which  Z is faced by any other approach, i.e. by any form of internalism (the thesis that warrant is  Z bestowed on a belief only by some other beliefs or doxastic states of the same subject)zX  ~JR ԍThere is an approach which is somewhat intermediary between externalism and internalism, viz. John Pollock's (in [Pollock, 1986]), for which a belief may get its justification from something which is neither external (outside the subject's mind) nor doxastic, namely his perceptions. I'll refrain from discussing that approach here.z,  Z namely, the counterfactual paradox . Suppose a believer, d, who is warranted (whether relatively or nonrelatively) in having a certain belief, b, not because of a warranting situation obtaining in the world but because of d's doxastic state. Suppose now a counterpart of d, c, in an ever so different world, but whose doxastic state is, in relevant respects, the same as d's. c's world can be as different from d's as you please : we can regard d's criteria as reliable, with respect to his world, but not those of c. Yet any internalism of any ilk is bound to hold c as warranted as d can be. That is why " the externalist concludes " internalism is untenable. The trouble with externalism is that it deprives us of any criterion about the soundness of our own criteria. Suppose we [d] had a [meta]criterion like that: it would consist in a way of sifting criteria, or doxastic canons, in accordance with something or other we could be aware of, ascertain, find out; i.e. in accordance with some other beliefs " otherwise the socalled criterion would be anything but a criterion, that is to say something we can apply in order to sift out the wheat of good doxastic canons from the chaff of bad ones. Since our counterparts [c] in the conceived alternative world would have a doxastic state which in relevant respects would be the same as ours, they, too, would have the [meta]criterion. Still, by hypothesis our [d's] canons would give us warrant, whereas theirs wouldn't. So our [meta]criterion would be of no avail. It would not be because of being selected thanks to the [meta]criterion that our canons would be truthconducive, but quite independently of that, by the sheer and bare happening of some things in the world. As for the socalled counterfactual paradox, I do not think the imagined state of affairs is paradoxical. Our imaginary counterparts would be as warranted in their beliefs as we are, even if our warrant is truthtracking and theirs is not. For, what we need in order to call a doxastic canon warranting, or good, or correct, is not its being in whatever imaginable situation truthconducive, but its being so in the actual situation. What gives our beliefs warrant is our being in some doxastic state, that doxastic state being in a wellbehaved , nothoodwinking world such that applications of the procedures by using which we attain those beliefs(%o.--  Z typically tend to be truthconducive.; ~J ԍOddly externalists talk in a quite similar way. But their contentions can be construed in several ways " see e.g. [Sosa, 1988]: 165. In a nutshell the difference between externalism and the internalism I am advocating is this. Externalists regard warrant as bestowed upon a belief by the possible world the belief belongs to, in such a way that no belief is justified if it is reached by  ~J a method which is not there [in that world] reliable, or if it there lacks the necessary causal relationship with the world. My approach  ~J replaces that indexical treatment with a fixed one, the term `warrant' rigidly designating a relation between beliefs of a subject which is in fact truthconducive, i.e. truthconducive in the actual world.; Within a malignantgeniusridden world things of course would be different, and our warranting criteria would not be truthconducive in that sense; nonetheless we would be warranted or justified while clinging to them, or applying them. While externalism is advanced as a way of parrying relativism's threat, it is perhaps ironic that it can in turn be considered a sort of warrant relativism, since it can be construed as claiming that a belief is not warranted, period, but warranted only as regards a certain obtaining situation, or as regards some world or other. Now, that being so, should we grant the relativists that truth cannot outstretch warrant, truth, too, would be relative. Admittedly some modeltheoretic approaches to truth may be looked upon in that way, as claiming that a sentence is not unqualifiedly true or false, but only either true or false as regards a particular world. But then such kind of approaches can be twisted or reshaped in such a way that it would be claimed that the reference points needn't be complete worlds, but so to speak subworlds. That would mean that within a world a sentence could have different truthvalues for different subworlds, whatever a subworld might consist in. Thus truth relativism would be vindicated and in the end espoused, if in a roundabout way. It is owing to all the above reasons that I do not hold externalism to be a satisfactory alternative to [truth] relativism, for a start, since it agrees that truth cannot outstretch warrant. And in the end it turns out to be [at least construable as committed to] a particular variety of relativism.   Z 3." Why Not to Ward Relativism off by Means of Foundationalistic Justification ) If externalism fails, does internalism succeed? Internalism, we know, has it that nothing gives a belief warrant or justification except other beliefs or doxastic states of the same subject. But we can distinguish two different kinds of internalism. One of them, foundationalism, claims that some beliefs are justified by their having some special property or determination,  Z and not in virtue of some other beliefs or doxastic states of the same subject.@ ~J " ԍFor a long time Chisholm was regarded as the main exponent of foundationalism. Recently, though, I take it that the most  ~J" outstanding defense and articulation of fundationalism is Paul K. Moser's. See, e.g., [Moser,1985]. Thus, foundationalism deflects the relativistic threat, not by challenging the relativistic assumption that truth cannot outstretch warrant, but by contending that there is nonrelative warrant or justification, since the ultimate or basic beliefs are endowed with some selfwarranting property, owing to which it is not the case that any warranting process either goes on in a nonterminating way or else is stopped at some basic beliefs which are just taken for granted " fundamental presuppositions. For a belief to be selfwarranting cannot mean for it to warrant itself, since doubtless the warranting relation is irreflexive. It is bound to mean that the belief in question has some property which justifies it in a nonrelative way. Now, if such is the case, the warrant in"o.-- question can involve no inference, since otherwise it would be relational. But should a belief enjoy any kind of noninferential justification, it would be incorrigible, unchallengeable, undeniable, unassailable. For, if a belief is challenged, surely it is so on the ground of some beliefs, from which the denial, or the rejection, of the belief can be drawn as a sort of conclusion " which means that the challenge is inferential; and then, whenever a challengeable belief is being maintained, it owes its being held to the absence of the challenging or undermining grounds. Which in turn means that it is not the case that its justification, whatever it may amount to, is independent of the presence of inferential relations. Therefore, any selfwarranting belief " in the sense explained above " is bound to be past doubt or challenge. But there are cogent reasons why no belief at all is entirely indubitable. Those reasons are, to put it briefly, connected with [Quinean] holism, and needn't be dwelt on here. Accordingly, I  Z[ conclude that there are no selfwarranting beliefs.X[  ~J ԍThat no belief, whether mathematical  or empirical , is unassailable I have tried to show in several places, e.g. in [Pe9a,  ~J 1979], in [Pe9a, 1980] and in chap. 2 of my new book (still in progress, as I am writing the present article) entitled Philosophical  ~Jl Findings (in Spanish). Moreover, the ascription of selfwarrant to certain kinds of beliefs " such as logical axioms, or observation beliefs" can be disputed by showing that each of those beliefs is granted warrant by some other beliefs or doxastic states of the same subject. The controversy on this issue being widely known, there is no need to go into details here. Finally, what could possibly constitute a property of beliefs such that by having it a belief would be justified? Either such a property consists in a certain determination plus the fact that the subject is aware thereof, or else the latter conjunct is not needed. But in the latter case, we backslide into externalism, and so face the same difficulties encountered in the foregoing Section. Hence, the property in question is such that its warranting power calls for the subject to be aware of the fact that the belief under consideration has that property. But that means that it is a necessary condition that the subject has another belief to the effect that the purportedly selfwarranting belief has the property. Suppose now two subjects having the same beliefs, including, for some belief b, the belief that b has the appropriate property rendering it selfwarranted; but only one of those subjects is such that its having b does in fact possess that property. From an internalistic viewpoint both subjects are alike. So, foundationalism is incompatible with internalism. I conclude that foundationalism, of any ilk, does not offer a convincing alternative to relativism. Its drawback is that it concedes to relativism the main assumption, that truth cannot outstretch warrant.   Zn  4." Defending a relativistic View of Warrant  Z! ) I want to reject [truth] relativism, while espousing warrantrelativism. X! ~J' ԍMy relativistic view of warrant is only one of the points my approach shares with E. Sosa's socalled virtue perspectivism  " see [Sosa, 1988]. Only, Sosa's account is also indexical and brinks on externalism, since it develops a kind of canon on criteria of adjudicating knowledge claims in accordance with the adjudicator's perspective. My approach is not concerned with ascriptions of warrant, but with the fact of warrant, or anyway with selfascriptions of it. (Notice that my contention that warrant is relative is not the same as the claim that any knowledge claim is relatively true because the kind, strength or level of warrant required  ~J+ for a belief to qualify as knowledge is variable in accordance with context; such is Robert Hambourger's proposal in [Hambourger,+o.-- 1987]: 24170. On my own opinion, though, knowledge is just true belief, so there is no variation such as Hambourger suggests. But if " as I claim " there are degrees of warrant, of course claiming that a belief is warranted is more (pragmatically) proper in some contexts than in others, according to how high the caution standard  is in the context.) That means! o.--  Z that I dispute the assumption common to all approaches I have thus far canvassed and criticized, namely that truth cannot outstretch warrant. I have never come across any cogent argument for that assumption. More often than not something like that assumption is taken for granted: `See, you cannot know for true what you do not have sufficient grounds to regard as true; and you cannot give a certain statable content more credence than what your grounds for doing so allow you to; so...' But arguing that way " which is not very clear " would amount to begging the question. Or you may appeal to some basic intuition , which would surface through our feeling entitled to ask a `How do you know?' whenever we hear someone put forward a claim. But again arguing like that is begging the question. Doubtless we want to learn about any person's grounds for his contentions. That does not mean, though, that those contentions' truth cannot stretch beyond the grounding or warranting they enjoy. It seems to me very clear that truth can outstretch warrant. Warrant gives us a hint, a clue, about the truth, but any human warrant is fallible and, on the other hand, there is no impossibility about a warrantless true belief " whether (as I have claimed elsewhere, in [Pe9a, 1988b]) such a belief is knowledge or not. There are a great many beliefs which turn out to be true but whose warrant can be regarded as dubious or worse. Columbus's grounds for believing that there were emerged lands not too far from the Atlantic AfroEuropean coast westwards were flimsy and in fact contrary to widely accepted measures of the Earth's size; they mostly hinged on attaching weight to unreliable sources. In fact Columbus drew that conclusion from the false premise that the distance between the Western European Coast and the Eastern Asian coast was a small one, only a few thousand miles. Inspite of all that, his belief was true, and its truth by far outreaches its shaky warrant. (I mean what I say when I claim that its truth outreaches its warrant, namely that its degree of truth is greater or higher than its degree of warrant. My general approach being characterized by a recognition of degrees of truth, it is plain that one thing is for a proposition " or sentence, or whatever may be a truthbearer " to be true, another thing for it to be warranted; the latter being nothing else but the truth of the proposition " or sentence " that the former proposition is warranted. The common scale is provided by the degreesoftruth ranking, whether we can measure it or not and regardless also of whether mentioning the comparison is pragmatically relevant in a particular context or not.) Likewise, why or how does warrant's relativeness yield the relativity of truth? There  Z is a non sequitur here which is probably due to a confusion. The confusion lies in mistaking  Zu subjective reactions for objective relations. For reasons pertaining to pragmatic rules , it misbecomes a person to say something is true but that she lacks any ground for believing it to be so " or that her grounds are wrong or weak, or anyway do not lend the belief as much credibility as it deserves in virtue of its degree of truth; or anything like that. Anyone talking this way would merit to be scoffed at " unless he went on to add that he hopes to find stronger grounds for the belief in question and is in fact looking for them. For the incongruity  of asserting [or claiming to believe] something while offering avowedly poor, or unsound, or lame grounds for it and yet acknowledging one's abstention from seeking stronger grounds, is of a pragmatic cast, that is to say constitutes an infringement of pragmatic rules presiding'  o.-- over communication processes. It is not of a semantic or ontological nature, as is confirmed by the fact that, when speaking in 3dperson, you can ascribe to a man harbouring an opinion with only feeble grounds or even no grounds at all without thereby committing any such incongruity and without imputing it to that man. Now, there are powerful, cogent arguments in support of warrantrelativism. A belief can only be warranted or justified by other beliefs or doxastic states of the same subject, as we've been able to conclude from our discussion of externalism and foundationalism. Are we then going to say that, while a belief may be warranted by some set of other beliefs [or other doxastic states], it may utterly fail to be warranted, all the same? In other words, is  Z there a nonrelational property of being warranted , such that not everything warranted [in  Z the relational sense] by something or other is warranted tout court? That seems to me extremely unlikely. For, if a belief, b, warranted by something, completely fails to be warranted, what would amount to its being warranted over and above its being warranted by something? Either it would be a particular property of the warranting entity " be it [a set of] other beliefs or whatever. Or else it has nothing to do with what the warranting entity happens to be. The latter alternative leads back into foundationalism or externalism, and so does the former, even if proving it does is not so straightforward. But then, we conclude that whatever is warranted by something or other is warranted, period. The converse entailment is obvious, unless foundationalism or externalism are espoused. Accordingly, warrant is relative, at least in the sense that, should there be any nonrelational property of being warranted, it would supervene upon the relational property of being warranted by something, or would be a necessary and sufficient condition for the latter. I do not intend to sketch out how a relativistic account of epistemic warrant can be implemented. The task has been discharged elsewhere (in [Pe9a, 1979],[Pe9a, 1980], and [Pe9a, 1988b]) by putting forward what has been called a gradualistic progressive internalism " progressive, since it allows for endless chains of justification, i.e. infinite warranting progressions.   Z  M 5." A Transcendental Argument against [Truth] Relativism ) A canon for choosing theories which has been laid down and is commonly accepted (see,for instance, [Perkins & Hubin, 1986] " even though their articulation of the canon is somehow different) is that of refusing to admit any theory such that believing it to be true would be incompatible with believing that one believes it. In other words, there are no truths such that it is incongruous to believe both that they are true (or they hold) and that one believes them to be true. The incompatibility under consideration needn't be downright incoherence, but may consist in incoherence between those beliefs and a more fundamental  or deeply  Z$ rooted belief, or doxastic rule. (By an incoherence I mean an overcontradiction of the form p and notpatall , whereas an incompatibility between two sentences or beliefs may consist in the impossibility of conjoining them with some more basic beliefs without thereby bringing forth a downright incoherence. Thus incompatibility may be conditional or relative.) That canon is what gives ground and credence to transcendental arguments, to such arguments, that is, as conclude that the world is such and so from the premise that you can't) o.--  Z coherently believe it not to be so at all while also believing that you have such a belief.  ~J ԍI have examined this canon on theory choice and other topics related to transcendental arguments in [Pe9a, 1988a]. The present paper, though, departs in some (probably minor) respects from the position which I outlined there. I am going to illustrate the notion of transcendental argument with some examples. Take Davidson's argument against the existence of conceptual schemes, an argument contending that, should there be a conceptualscheme variation, you couldn't coherently believe that it existed and that you were aware of that existence, since such an awareness would call for you to understand more than one conceptual scheme, whereas such schemes would be defined so as to thwart that very same possibility. Another transcendental argument is that which " against eliminativism in the philosophy of mind " concludes that mind exists from the premise that you can't coherently believe that there is no mind and that you so believe " under the assumption that no belief exists unless mind exists, too. Or take the argument against the impossibility of semantics put forward by a few authors, an argument alleging that you couldn't coherently believe that semantics was impossible and that you believed it " the argument assuming that the existence of beliefs entails the at least possible existence of some  Z= semantics or other, surely on the ground that every belief is at least express ible . Also Putnam's argument against the braininavat hypothesis: you cannot coherently believe that you are a brain in a vat and that you believe you are a brain in a vat " the argument assuming some Putnamian claims on semantic issues. Or, finally, an argument against the possibility of there being nothing, which is a modalized version of a transcendental argument: it is impossible for you to be able to coherently believe that nothing exists and that you believe that; therefore, something or other must perforce exist. There are similar arguments to be found in Leibniz  Z and in Kant's 1763 work Beweisgrund. Quite often transcendental arguments are offered as overpowering, staunch arguments no one has the right to resist under pain of committing himself to irrationalism or worse. In fact even the best transcendental arguments are not as knockdown as they are made out  Z to be. For the inference rule allowing to reject that  p  (or to assert that it is utterly false that p) from I cannot coherently believe at all that it is the case that p and that I believe that it is true that p  is an inductive (i.e. nondeductive) inference rule. Its applications depend on the subject's both having other beliefs which would produce the incoherence and lacking other beliefs to the effect that the incompatibility under consideration is contingent upon some particular circumstances. For instance, you cannot conclude that every humanly unimaginable event is ruled out on the ground that, should there be one, its being so would be a state of affairs such that you could believe it to exist and also believe you believe it, whereas, if you believed a certain event to be so or so, you would somehow or other imagine it, and thus it wouldn't be humanly unimaginable after all. The underlying error in that reasoning is that you do not lack a defeating or undermining belief. You have one, namely that, should one of those events take place while you'd be unable to believe it to be humanly unimaginable, that would be due only to the fact that the event couldn't be imagined by humans and you are human. It is quite a different matter, of course, to believe that there can be absolutely unthinkable events or facts. The covering (disjunctive) principle upon which transcendental arguments hinge is that  Z& each  p  is such that either one can coherently believe that it is not the case that p at all and that one so believes, or else p. However such a principle is not generally, or unqualifiedly, true. There can be p"s which our language cannot express and about which we can thinkx(  o.-- nothing and which for all that are wholly false. The disjunctive principle under consideration is only true with some provisos " e.g. that one's unableness to coherently believe that it's not the case that p at all and that one has such a belief is not ensuant upon some less than ideal particularities of one's own doxastic situation. Unless one has any reason for thinking otherwise, one seems to be entitled to take it for granted, when entertaining any hypothesis, that one is not debarred from believing in its truth and in one's belief by one's peculiar situation " be it one's humanity or whatever. But that entitlement claim can only be justified by applying the same rule governing transcendental arguments in general. I think there is nothing mysterious about the idea of our having a reason for thinking that we are debarred from believing in some truths due to our peculiar situation. Thus, if we accept that some information is [for us, humans] irretrievably lost, we can contrive hypotheses such that we are aware we cannot, due to our finiteness, believe them to be true " while also holding other, more basic , beliefs of ours. So, for instance, suppose an information has been entirely lost concerning some black hole, including any piece of information as to whether or not p. While maintaining this and other beliefs, we cannot coherently believe that we believe that p. For one's believing that p entails his believing that both p and he believes that p (such a principle of doxastic logic is argued for in [Pe9a, 1980]). But believing that p rules out believing that one lacks any information whatsoever as to whether it is the case that p or not, unless of course an entirely groundless belief is possible. But most of us also harbor among our basic  beliefs one to the effect that every belief is prompted or elicited by some " ever so misleading " clue or hint. Hence not all those beliefs can stand together. And since we can imagine an information irretrievable for mankind, we know that some truths may be humanly unbelievable, due to our finite condition. Notice, though, that for an hypothesis to be " under certain circumstances " unbelievable is different from its being unimaginable. Is there any less circular way of arguing for the soundness of transcendental arguments " even with the provisos pointed at above? Let's try. If the covering disjunctive principle, even with those provisos, is utterly false, that fact has to be compatible with the best explanation, since " in accordance with the [nondeductive] inference rule yielding the truth of the best explanation available " nothing can be true if it is not compatible at all with the best explanation. But for any situation describable as a failure of the (duly qualified) disjunctive principle under consideration, there is an alternative description which is compatible with the best explanation and which does not fall afoul of that principle. What about the grounds for the inferencetothebestexplanation rule? If it is right, it must have a true best explanation. And the best explanation seems to be that the world is epistemically optimal, which means that whenever there are two available alternative theories one of them describing the world in a less satisfactory way than the other, the former is false. That thesis can be argued for through a transcendental argument : suppose the thesis is completely false and you believe it; it would then be incongruous for you to look after an explanation for those beliefs'[purported] truth, since, should there be one, and were it attainable, we could explain why the world is worse than we could conceive it without giving up any available evidence; but then that would mean our having some additional evidence to the effect that the world could not be better " and thus the envisaged situation would not be one of the world's being worse than we could conceive without running counter to any available evidence; but a leading principle and norm of all our theorizing is to just look for some explanation or other; so our theorizing would be incongruous. And we fail to see any less than ideal particularity of ours on which such commitment to seeking some explanation hinges. Ergo.+ o.--ԌAren't we running in a sort of circle? That's true. However, that only means that our warranting procedures do not rely on rocky ground, but are displayed in endless, nonterminating, processes, whether infinite chains or circles " which after all constitute a particular kind of endless chains, namely such as comprise recurring elements or links. Since warrant is relative, no awful or dismaying result threatens us through those revelations.  Z+ Now, suppose that [truth] relativism is true, i.e. that, for any  p ,  p  fails to have any truthvalue, while there is a relational predicate It is true that ... with respect to ---  such  Z  that for  p  as the first argument in this formula and something as the second argument, we have a true statement. Suppose also you believe it. What do you believe? That the result of  Z putting  p  in the place of ...  and (a name of) something or other in that of ---  in It  Z is true that ... with respect to ---  is true " true tout court? No, surely not. For you would  Z not then believe only in relative truth. Then, instead of that result's being true, what you'd believe in would be the state of affairs consisting in its being true with respect some particular reference point or other. Let's call that state of affairs s. And you wouldn't believe you believed s to be true, but, for some reference point, r, you'd believe that you believed that, with respect to r, s. Let's call s' that relativization of s to r. Now, s' couldn't happen or fail to happen as such, since a state of affairs happening is the same as the truth of the belief in its happening. Instead, s' would happen with respect to some reference point, r'. Its doing so would constitute another state of affairs, s. You would believe in the existence of s; only not just like that, in the air, but only with respect to some further reference point. And so on, and so forth, indefinitely. While that is not incoherent as far as it goes " and the argument does not involve availing oneself of the nonrelative notion of truth, which is the questionbegging which relativists  Z blame their opponents for X ~J ԍMy antirelativist argument is not the straightforward one that the relativist is committed to his own claims being nonrelatively  ~J true, which is the stockintrade way of refuting relativism; see e.g. [NewtonSmith, 1981]: 34ff. NewtonSmith's argument is rebutted  ~J by relativists as questionbegging; see [Young, 1986]. But that kind of reply is not open to them against my present argument. " surely such an infinite regress is not compatible with the principles and rules governing our theoretical and doxastic activity. The incompatibility I am pointing to consists in this. Our doxastic activity is made out by beliefs. However, should truth relativism be right, it couldn't consist in beliefs, a belief being a relation between one's mind and a content, but in relations each of which would be the limit of this progression: (1st step) a relation between a mind and a pair of things, viz. the content and something else;  Z; (2d step) a relation between the mind and a pair of things, the first member of this latter pair being the former pair; and so on. Notice that, even if warrant is relative, belief is not " according to my present account. Truth relativism, instead, allows for nothing but infinitely relative believings. Are the principles which govern our doxastic activity " including the one which rules that such an activity is made up by beliefs " contingent on some less than ideal particularity of ours? Could a nonhuman, more perfect, perhaps allknowing, person exist who would think and reason in such a way that she could be subject to such an infinite regress without her ways of thinking and reasoning clashing with it? There are several reasons why such an hypothesis seems most unlikely, or worse. In fact we seem entitled to expect the contrary, that no such person can exist. If she is more perfect than we are, and we have beliefs, surely she also has beliefs, whereas the infinite doxastic regress we've seen truthrelativism entails prevents anyone from having beliefs " in the just explained sense of being related to a certain'  o.-- content in a particular way. Truth relativism rules out any such relation, since the content would need to be embedded at an infinite depth within the second argument of the relation. Thus it is not in virtue of some imperfection of ours that our doxastic activity fails to comply with what truthrelativism would enforce. Consequently, not only can't we coherently believe that truth relativism is correct and that we believe it, but, furthermore, we lack any indication to the effect that such an impossibility is due to some imperfection of ours. So, our transcendental argument concludes  Z  that general truth relativism is not true. Not true at all . But, what about a nongeneral truth relativism: `Some truths are only relative, even if some other truths also hold in a nonrelative way'? That contention is not refuted by the foregoing transcendental argument, and in fact I shall propose it below, although with some qualifications.   Z  6." Towards [Partial] convergence ) I thus have come to reject truth relativism, while espousing warrant relativism. Yet, there is something to be said in support of truth relativism. Something important. If warrant is relative while truth is not, are we not doomed to remain, each of us, or each group of us, isolated, with the whole human community divided and split into uncommunicating circles? For, if your warrant is relative to the reasons you offer, and so on, where does anything surface pushing you towards a convergence with other people's reasonings? Or what allows one culture to be able to debate with another? Yes, truth is nonrelative. But each culture's warranting chains would be its own, and so nothing would constitute a higher reference point in virtue of which those different cultures were guaranteed to have a common warranting ground. So my proposal seems to condemn " or at least to open the possibility of condemning " different people or different cultures, or paradigms, to a mutual isolation. Their different opinions would clash " but they would not have any means of fruitfully arguing about such disagreements. The relativist, on the other hand, would pronounce those disagreements either to be nonexistent or only relatively existent (such is the verdict of meaningrelativism) or else not to consist in divergences (property so called): there would be no clash, either in virtue of incommensurability prevailing (meaning relativism) or at least in virtue of truthrelativity. My proposal would block any convergence, while retaining the clash. The relativist would deny the clash and so at least allow for a kind of convergence, namely that of each partner's agreeing that his own viewpoint or opinion is not superior to the other's (at least not superior as far as truthfinding is concerned) " agreeing to disagree, but to disagree in a clashless way (true for you, false for me). Have I anything better to offer? I think I have. Nothing absolute or allencompassing. Just something which, for one thing, permits a number of bordercrossings and a wide range of paradigmannexations or blendings, and, for another, allows for the same state of affairs being truer or more existent from one perspective, less true " or even, in some cases, completely false " from another. Let me first run over and sum up the path that eventuates in the kind a approach I want to propose here to the issues connected with relativism. Relativism is a sort of radical reaction to the scandal of PV or, more generally, of apparently unsurmountable disagreements. Relativism adjudicates those disagreements by+ o.-- granting each contending party as much as possible, namely: each party is right but right  Z only from its own viewpoint, which means that what it claims is true as regards its own  Z framework or paradigm or position . (Or at least such is the case for many, deeprooted, wideranging disagreements.) Both externalism and foundationalism offer means of countering relativism (even though neither a relativistic externalism, nor a relativistic foundationalism are unthinkable or necessarily incoherent), but they do so while granting relativists their main underlying assumption to the effect that truth doesn't outstretch warrant. Thus, those two approaches reject truth relativism insomuch only as they also reject warrant relativism. But then a new scandal arises. It is not just that there are clashing opinions with no prospect of being reconciled " whereas of two contrary opinions one at most can be true " but, moreover, only one of the conflicting views can be warranted " at least in a number of such cases. Hence, the PV reveals a hideous feature of human nature, a perhaps invincible irrationality, evinced by staunch adherence to unwarranted [utterly] false beliefs. What I have hitherto proposed " in the previous Sections " agrees with relativism that warrant is relative, but, by dint of challenging the assumption commonly held by relativists, externalists, and foundationalists alike, namely that truth does not outstretch warrant, agrees with externalists and foundationalists that truth is not [in all cases] relative. Now the scandal abates, since PV, irksome though it still is, does no longer point to any widespread or deeprooted irrationality; only to widespread error, which nevertheless would be excusable insomuch as, warrant being relative, and so no guarantee being available for our doxastic systems, it would be just a matter of chance to have found an actually truthtracking warranting line. However, the emerging human plight might be still bleak. Should finding oneself following a truthbound path be a matter of chance " of chance in the sense that at least as often as not people would be following falsenessbound paths ", no convergence could be hoped for and it would be hard to explain how or why one does as a sheer matter of fact find oneself following [what he takes to be] a truthtracking path. Furthermore, our warrant relativism, by dismissing any ultimate epistemic guarantee, allows us only relative, precarious, fallible guarantees , in a weak sense; now, anyone's guarantee " in that sense " to the effect that he is following a correct, or truthtracking, path cannot fail to be backwardslooking, i.e. to lie in a tracing back to previous stages of thought. For, since every warrant is inferential, all justification or warrant one has for one's ideas issues from such previous beliefs or doxastic states of the inferential processes eventuating in one's current beliefs. To be sure, some nondeductive inferences are processes of belief correction, which give rise to removing some of one's previous beliefs. Still, the inference is correct only if it relies on a number of true covering principles which one was holding when applying the inference rule, i.e. when making the inference under consideration. Those beliefs are connected with others in such a way that, unless much or even most of what one then believed was [at least up to a point] right, the conclusions reached cannot even be reasonably expected to be true, and so are not warranted  Z% [at all], even with the relative kind of warrant, or weak guarantee , that our approach acknowledges. For, admittedly, whatever else epistemic warrant consists in, it requires at the very least that the warranted belief be thereby endowed with a determination in virtue of which one is reasonably entitled to expect it to be true; warrant's relativity does not thwart that entitlement " only it makes it relative : you are so entitled not in the air , in a nonrelative way, but solely with respect to some antecedent beliefs or doxastic state of yours.X* o.--ԌNow, each human person's series of inferential processes goes back to bodies of beliefs and doxastic states which she has inherited through cultural imbuing. Each inferential or warranting line can be traced back to reasoning patterns and ideas which have been bequeathed to us by our forefathers. If much, or most, of what they used to think was wrong, our inferential warrants are useless and futile " in fact, as I've argued, they are not warrants at all. Thus, whenever a different paradigm from ours has preceded the current one we stand by and cling to, either the former one was mostly right, or ours is wrong. But surely any two ever so distant paradigms share a common ancestry, at least a remote one. And more often than not they share a close partial ancestry. Take, for instance, the case of Latin" and NorthAmerican cultures or paradigms. Even if they have evolved in different ways, their mutual heritage is undeniable. The Mediterranean and European culture has pervaded, shaped or " up to a point at least " even given rise to any current American culture. The bequest of preColumbian cultures is variable, with a number of both North" and LatinAmerican countries owing much more to the Old Continent's legacy " which includes African cultures " than to the indigenous one. Even the Amerindian cultures probably shared some mutual legacy too, as well as, if not exactly certain common features, at least a family air  " they were pairwise legacysharing. Of course, the disparity or even variance between Latin" and NorthAmerican cultures goes back (in part) to a divergence between such European cultures as respectively influenced them; but nobody would deny that those cultures too are but branches of one tree. Now, the wronger is what people belonging to another culture believe and the more their thinking methods and canons as well as their main persuasions have [indirectly, to be sure] originated " through applications of inference rules which some of our own ancestors held to be correct " from a stock of opinions which was also shared by sundry forbears of ours, the more the emerging situation casts doubts on our own doxastic lineage, and accordingly on our current doxastic fund and patterns. Thus by a transcendental argument " of the sort presented above " we seem entitled to conclude that, since we are right in most of our beliefs, so were our ancestors and so are people in other cultures, people who cling to different paradigms, even when those seem to be at variance with ours. I am aware this conclusion sounds paradoxical and in a way it is so. I hope the next Section will clarify how I think the paradox is to be resolved or understood.  Z If that conclusion is right, some kind of convergence or confluence is to be expected between followers of what at first sight seem to be divergent paradigms. Otherwise, it would be unlikely for most opinions making up each of those paradigms to be true or right. If they are true, they must in the end turn out to be compatible among themselves. That's what brings about the need for convergence. And in its own way relativism satisfies that need by claiming that within each paradigm the most commonly held opinions are true [with respect] to the paradigm. But, for reasons we have considered above, things cannot be so, since truth relativism also falls afoul of a transcendental argument. Consequently, we feel bound to articulate our own approach so as to accommodate the need for convergence. There are two ways of doing so. I'm going to consider both in the next section. * o.--Ԍ Z  7." A Gradualistic Paraconsistent Way to Convergence  Zg  7.1." Perspectivism and NonCopulative Paraconsistent Logics ) The first way towards implementing " or at least allowing for " some sort of convergence  Z is what can be termed perspectivism . Loosely speaking perspectivism views itself as a doctrine which, while rejecting the relativistic contention that every truth is relative, claims that there are truths which are, in a certain sense, more appropriate , or the like, from one perspective or horizon than from another. (Strong versions of perspectivism may generalize that situation, attributing it to all truths of a certain kind, or even to all truths of any kind.) The snag is that it is difficult to elucidate that unperspicuous notion of appropriat